CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.582
14 February 1991

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Thursday, 14 February 1991, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. W. Rasaputram (Sri Lanka)

GE.91-60319/2920B

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 582nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the very beginning, I wish to extend a warm welcome in the Conference to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, His Excellency Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, who will address this plenary meeting. The Minister has been following our work very closely, as shown by his visits to the Conference, where he has presented on many occasions the views of his Government on disarmament matters, in particular one of the high-priority subjects on our agenda, the banning of chemical weapons. I wish to thank His Excellency Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati for his interest in the work of the Conference and for his presence among us today.

I am happy to report to you that my consultations on organizational arrangements for a number of agenda items have made substantial progress during the last week; we should now be in a position to take decisions on many of those questions which have been pending. Once the list of speakers is exhausted, we shall proceed to take up those questions requiring a decision by the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers today His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as the representatives of Sweden, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Australia, Germany, the United Kingdom, Cameroon, Indonesia and Peru. I now give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, His Excellency Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati.

Mr. VELAYATI (Islamic Republic of Iran): The first month of the work in the Conference on Disarmament is always the most challenging and difficult part of the year. Your able and wise leadership during this period, Mr. President, is well recognized and appreciated. Finding myself once again in your midst gives me mixed feelings: the pleasure of talking and exchanging views with you, and the discomfort of having to share with you yet another tragic and sad experience in our region.

It is the paradox of history that the weapons provided to Iraq have now turned against their own suppliers. The Persian Gulf has now become the scene of the test of the most destructive weapons of our time. Cruise missiles are being battle-tested for the first time. Satellite-guided Slams, ultra-high-speed Patriots and ALARMs (air-launched anti-radar missiles) have come to the challenge of Scuds and Frogs. The destruction is frightening and the loss of life incalculable.

It is clear that this war will not solve problems, but rather exacerbate existing inequalities and injustices, leading to an escalated arms race. I am not going to argue here whether the arms race breeds tension or tension accelerates the arms race. It is, however, clear that they are mutually reinforcing. Proliferation, limitation, restriction or prohibition as well as arms control and disarmament are all properly security concerns, whether national, regional or international. The problem of the arms race is inextricably linked to regional security issues. Efforts to limit the arms race are linked to the process of eliminating existing hotbeds of tension,

(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

removing sources of inequalities and injustices, properly addressing the security concerns of all, and following an impartial and principled approach to existing problems.

The situation in the Persian Gulf is getting out of hand. The crisis which was initiated by Iraq's occupation of Kuwait and exacerbated by the unprecedented and massive foreign military build-up in the region - with objectives that go beyond the liberation of Kuwait - has now entered the fifth week of an all-out war with no apparent end in sight. The destruction and instability brought to the region in the space of the last seven months, which is clearly the result of irresponsible policies of the past, is beyond reason.

The massive loss of human life, in particular the not so collateral civilian casualties, was certainly not what was envisaged or proclaimed at the adoption of Security Council resolution 678. The destruction of Iraq and Kuwait as well as the economic resources of the region is hardly compatible with the maintenance of regional and international peace and security. Furthermore, insistence, seemingly by both sides, on a military solution as well as statements concerning the post-war situation paint an uncertain and indeed dangerous picture for the future of the Persian Gulf.

Under these circumstances, it is of vital necessity to work out a political solution based on Iraq's unconditional and complete withdrawal from Kuwait, the withdrawal of foreign forces from the region, the inviolability of international boundaries in the Persian Gulf and respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all States in that area.

The imperative need for the creation of a "security and co-operation arrangement in the Persian Gulf area" is now more than ever evident. In 1986, the Islamic Republic of Iran presented the idea of the establishment of such a system, and Security Council resolution 598 provides the necessary institutional framework. The long-term security and stability of the region and the undeniable necessity of preventing further occurrences of aggression demand the creation of such an arrangement through the initiative of the countries of the Persian Gulf region with the co-operation of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, which would provide the necessary assurances and ensure its compatibility with United Nations principles and objectives.

The "security and co-operation arrangement in the Persian Gulf area" must include all countries of the region, as any exclusion would be the seed of future tension and instability. It is equally necessary that such a system should be free from foreign presence, intervention and interference, as these practices are historically and inherently destabilizing.

On the basis of these principles, the Islamic Republic of Iran took every step to prevent a war, and at this stage is actively seeking a responsible political solution to bring an end to the war with its disastrous consequences. We have maintained our channels of communication with the leadership of Iraq as well as those of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other countries in the region. We believe that every effort should be directed towards fostering political will on both sides for the attainment of these principles, which would pave the way for the formulation of a comprehensive

(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

proposal to end the hostilities. With this in view, our President presented an "idea for peace" to the President of Iraq during the recent visit by Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister. The contacts and dialogue are continuing, and it is our understanding that there is room for the continuation of diplomatic activities, and thus we will continue our efforts individually and within the framework of the Non-Aligned Movement on the basis of the decision taken two days ago in Belgrade.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the region and the indiscriminate use of chemical weapons in the past decade are now coupled with the spectre of their possible use in the Persian Gulf war. Any such use will undoubtedly bring about unpredictable consequences whose implications could be catastrophic for all. Even talk here and there by officials of the warring parties is dangerous.

It is even more alarming that not only threats exist of the possible use of chemical weapons, but there is even reference to a possible resort to nuclear arms. Aside from an immediate need to prevent such a disastrous situation in this conflict, one is now more inclined to insist, for the long term, that any commitment regarding weapons of mass destruction ought to be comprehensive and include chemical weapons and nuclear weapons as well as sophisticated conventional weaponry. With regard to nuclear weapons, one could now conclude that accession to the non-proliferation Treaty by all States seems a necessary requirement.

The draft convention on chemical weapons should also be freed of any discriminatory provisions. It should enhance the security of all nations. Ideas such as the retention of chemical weapon stocks, whatever the pretext, will give the impression of the military utility of such weapons and will be detrimental to our common cause.

Furthermore, universality is the keyword for our work in this regard. The incentives for joining the convention and disincentives for those who remain outside will play a determining role in this respect. Since underdevelopment poses a threat to the security of developing countries, any provision which may harm the legitimate development of civil chemical industry should be prevented.

But still, the most significant task to be tackled in order to ensure universality and prepare suitable ground whereby States would find it safe and secure to join the convention is to maintain a balance at the global, and more importantly at the regional level for the security of States. The fact that the chemical weapons convention would generally enhance the security of States remains valid, but this cannot be sufficient when one comes to the actual point of making a decision to join this convention. For each country, national security reigns supreme. Every State will wish to have enough assurances that its security will not be diminished through joining the convention. I must add that this is particularly relevant in regions which are hotbeds of tension and where chemical weapons have already been used.

(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

Let me conclude by reiterating that the effects of the current crisis in the Persian Gulf will go beyond the region, although its consequences for future stability and security in the region itself will be immense and long-lasting. In reality, this crisis will determine whether political or military solutions will prevail in international affairs. One way or another, both parties have chosen the military option, which in fact will only be a lost game. Our individual and joint efforts should all be directed at reversing this trend and generating the necessary political will to prevent the catastrophe from gaining further momentum. My country will spare no effort in this regard.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran for his important statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Hyltenius.

Mr. HYLTENIUS (Sweden): I have listened with great interest to the important statement just made by His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran. I am sure that it will be read with great interest in many capitals, including my own.

My delegation today wishes to introduce document CD/1053 on "Verification of the chemical industry within the general pattern of verification of a chemical weapons convention".

The proposal contained in CD/1053 is already well known to all delegations. A first version was circulated for consultations to all groups and China in November. My delegation made a special presentation in the Group of 21, and was gratified also to be invited to the Group of Western States for a detailed discussion. Delegations from all groups and several observer delegations approached us during the inter-sessional period to obtain clarifications and share their preliminary views. By and large my delegation has been encouraged to proceed and to develop the ideas contained in the consultation paper.

In elaborating the new document, which is now before you, we have thus been able to draw on a considerable amount of comments from a large number of delegations. I would like to take this opportunity to thank those delegations that have spent time studying our proposal and conveying their views and questions to us. The amendments and additions that have been made to the paper are mainly aimed at clarifying a number of points, but a few substantive additions have also been made. The fact that the basic approach of the paper has not been questioned by any delegation that has studied it in detail gives us good hope that the paper will be given serious consideration in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

Against this background any further introduction may be superfluous. Still, I would like to make some general comments. First, I would like to state what this paper is not. It is not a tactical proposal for the purpose of unlocking the apparent stalemate in discussions on verification in the chemical industry. My delegation has for a long time had doubts regarding the cost-effectiveness of schedule 2 verification as provided for in the draft convention. These doubts have matured over the years. The intense

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

involvement of my delegation in the evaluation of the many national trial inspections has given us ample opportunity to take a close look at the provisions of annex II to article VI.

The NTI exercise taught us a limited lesson, namely that the inspections envisaged in annex II to article VI in the draft convention could technically be implemented. The Committee chose to stop at that conclusion. The national trial inspections as designed, however, could not serve to demonstrate that such inspections were effective in terms of an overall verification objective. Only a few delegations commented openly on the apparent futility of "crawling around one single reactor or production line" for a day when a number of similar reactors on the premises were undeclared and not even available for any kind of verification except on challenge. The doubts, which everyone that carried out an NTI must have felt, were however expressed by some through proposals for additions to the system in the shape of ad hoc inspections.

While discussing these proposals my delegation gradually came to the conclusion that an imperfect system would hardly get any better by adding to it. Instead, we started to look for ways and means to amend the present system in such a way that a comprehensive and unified approach could be taken to the chemical industry in its entirety. In doing so we had to depart from an imperfect material-balance verification of a narrow segment of the relevant industry to follow a verification concept that creates transparency in the entire industry concerned, combined with selective on-site verification efforts, either directed or at random. The outline given in CD/1053 is thus a proposal in its own right, which should be discussed and judged on its own merits and not in the light of provisions in the "rolling text" or other proposals under discussion.

The second thing this proposal is not is an unravelling of the "rolling text", an undoing of work done. This new approach is, rather, a redirection within a given framework. It builds on what has been already achieved or discussed, including experience from national trial inspections. Furthermore, the proposal in CD/1053 can contribute to solving some difficult outstanding issues. Thus the present schedule 2 verification in the "rolling text" cannot be said to be really agreed until the issues of modalities for determining the frequency of inspections and the actual contents of schedule 2 have been resolved. And those are major and difficult tasks. The approach in CD/1053 would resolve the issue of frequency and would permit a quick and easy compromise on the contents of the schedules. Finally, in the view of my delegation, the incorporation of CD/1053 into the "rolling text" would not require any major effort.

Far from re-opening a closed chapter, the outline in CD/1053 would permit the Conference to conclude one of the most difficult unresolved parts of the chemical weapons negotiations, namely how to create a sufficient degree of confidence that capabilities in the chemical industry are not misused for purposes prohibited by the convention, without undue intrusiveness and interference in perfectly legitimate industrial activities, and without causing unacceptable costs to the States parties.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

As I have stated, CD/1053 is in the first place an outline in which the details are to be developed. Discussion of it should therefore first focus on its basic concepts. Among its basic concepts I would like to underline the obligation to declare all CW-capable plant sites, whether or not they actually produce listed chemicals, and thereby the undertaking to accept short-notice on-site inspections at any of these. Such inspections should be streamlined and aimed primarily at verifying declarations on planned activities and the absence of activities that should have been declared. It is of particular importance to note that such inspections, according to the proposal, would focus on ongoing activities instead of trying to verify past activities. This helps to avoid unnecessary anomalies and ambiguities.

Hence we have on the one hand, broader openness and transparency than hitherto contemplated, and on the other hand less intrusiveness and interference in those cases where an actual inspection is carried out. My delegaiton proposes to identify CW-capable facilities through the use of certain chemical conversion processes. It might not be possible to use this classification absolutely unambiguously for each and every plant site. It is the view of my delegation, however, that a list of chemical conversion processes would be sufficiently clear to implement obligations under the convention. The responsibility to define exactly how the obligation to declare should be implemented in each State party could be entrusted to national legislation. Certainly, guidelines could be recommended through consultative multilateral work in the preparatory commission.

The negative verification approach, coupled with the absence of facility agreements in CD/1053, goes a long way towards streamlining the actual inspections and responding to legitimate concerns regarding confidentiality in industry. In fact, Sweden has carried out a national trial inspection on the basis of the approach taken in CD/1053. The result was encouraging. The inspectors were satisfied with the verification result - the absence of any production of listed chemicals - and the facility was particularly satisfied at the absence of a facility agreement, the elaboration of which would have required the facility to provide sensitive process information in written form.

Many delegations have asked questions regarding the selection of facilities for inspection. In the view of my delegation this problem is not of major importance. The overall approach, including the declaration régime, the concentration on production, the definition of CW-capable industry and the similar treatment of schedules 2 and 3, should be discussed first. Were those elements to be accepted, the selection principles could certainly be negotiated without too much difficulty.

It has been natural for my delegation to build on the present annex II in providing for obligatory inspections in those facilities that actually produce schedule 2 and schedule 3 chemicals. In addition, it is proposed that inspections should take place in these as well as in other CW-capable facilities through a system which blends directed efforts with random selection. We think all of these elements may be necessary. How actually to combine them - a higher or lesser degree of random selection - can certainly be discussed. But again, in the view of my delegation, this is a practical detail rather than a matter of principle in our proposal.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

CD/1053 is largely self-explanatory. I have therefore only tried briefly to comment further on some of the salient points and to dissipate any possible misunderstanding of the paper, its contents and objectives. It is now in the hands of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. We look forward to more formal discussion of it.

Mr. KRALIK (Czechoslovakia): First of all, Mr. President, we would like to extend to you our warm congratulations on taking up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament, and thank you for discharging your important responsibilities during the starting phase of our work. I also take this opportunity to express our gratitude to your predecessor, Mr. Chirila, who fulfilled the duties of President in August and during the inter-sessional period. My delegation sincerely welcomes the presence of the distinguished Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, who addressed the Conference at the beginning of this plenary meeting.

Since the last session of the Conference the very skilful Ambassadors Ait Chaalal, Reese, Kostov, Varga, Sujka and Kosin have left Geneva. We extend a most cordial welcome to the new representatives of Algeria, Australia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia. We wish them every success.

Mr. President, you have invited us to avoid topics not belonging to this forum. It is a justified appeal, justified because it gives us the chance to devote more attention to the subjects really pertaining to disarmament. No doubt, the Conference cannot remain indifferent to the fact that there are growing apprehensions of the use of chemical and other non-conventional weapons. And this, above all, in those countries where the renowned nuclear mushroom has not appeared yet, but where an equally terrifying ecological bomb with boundless consequences for the flora and fauna of a region compared at one time to the biblical Eden has already exploded.

The assurance of some experts that the potential aggressor is not sufficiently technically prepared to use chemical weapons is, doubtless, a very meagre consolation. History teaches us the very opposite, and that is why I would like to mention in this connection the far-sighted message of Winston Churchill. With prophetic words this great statesman addressed humanity soon after Hitler's ruthless annexation of Austria and his brutal violation of Czechoslovakia, and before his preparations to attack Poland.

> "Is he going to try to blow up the world or not? The world is a very heavy thing to blow up! An extraordinary man at a pinnacle of power may create a great explosion, and yet the civilized world may remain unshaken. The enormous fragments and splinters may clatter down upon his own head and destroy him ... but the world will go on".

And the world went on. But at what a price! We recall it bitterly - in Europe as well as in the other continents. That is the reason why the new blows of destruction are not only a matter of apprehension for the Middle East nations. The best remedy against fear is positive behaviour. Therefore, I believe that this Conference should also take a positive step. Following the example of the group of 11 Latin American countries, and developing the ideas of President Mitterrand and other statesmen, we could, for example, renew the

(Mr. Králik Czechoslovakia)

initiative we were talking about last year. As an example, the Conference could possibly initiate a joint declaration by the member States of the Conference on Disarmament and those having observer status, undertaking not to be the first to use chemical weapons during the period of negotiations on the CWC.

I would like to devote my statement today to questions concerning the prohibition of chemical weapons (CW) and the finalization of the chemical weapons convention (CWC). In recent years, the Ad Hoc Committee on CW has moved toward completion of the CWC. However, there are certain open questions to be solved, some of them of a technical nature and some of a political character. In respect of both - political and technical - different working papers have been distributed dealing with various aspects of the future CWC. In the interests of openness and - if possible - obtaining more information from the States parties to the future CWC, the majority of delegations, including Czechoslovakia (in document CD/949) have presented working papers about their chemical potential. However, with a view to the future development of the "rolling text", a more detailed assessment of the needs of inspectors and financial aspects, and clarification of some technical questions, in my last statement in August 1990 our delegation announced a new document. The document contains very detailed data on Czechoslovakia's chemical potential, including not only qualitative but also quantitative data on the production, processing, consumption, export and import of chemicals falling under the scope of the future CWC. This document, numbered CD/1048, has just been distributed.

Let me say a few words about the philosophy of our approach. As stated in the past, and I can repeat it once again, Czechoslovakia has no CW. Our country also intends, and this is well known, to be an original party to the CWC. That is why we approach the CWC very seriously. Today I wish to inform you that we synthesize compounds on schedule 1, as you can see from the document distributed, of course in much smaller quantities than those permitted by the proposals contained in the present "rolling text".

In a spirit of good will and on a voluntary basis, we also declare and specify the facilities, including their owners and locations. We believe that after this declaration there will be a clearer picture of the verification requirements of the future CWC in one country. We hope for similar openness from other States because these data, taken together, are connected with personnel, equipment and other needs for implementation of the CWC. Let me inform distinguished delegations that these data can also be verified in a very simple way. Last year, bilateral talks were held between the United States Embassy in Prague and our Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, and on 17 December 1990 - on the basis of an agreement - United States specialists visited a Czechoslovak military facility in Slovakia used for synthesis of super-toxic lethal chemicals. As a result of this visit it was confirmed that the schedule 1 chemicals produced cannot be considered to be CW. For the same purpose, the commander of the facility authorized the use of a computerized data base to review the production of chemicals in a year selected at random from a 10-year period. The professionalism of the facility and its workers were appreciated. This high level of professionalism of Czechoslovak scientists can be documented now on the basis of the activities of a small but qualified group of military specialists in the Gulf.

(Mr. Králik, Czechoslovakia)

All these data serve as evidence of Czechoslovakia's interest in finalizing the CWC as soon as possible. More evidence of our real concern for chemical disarmament is provided by the withdrawal of our reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, announced by Foreign Minister Dienstbier of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic at the forty-fifth United Nations General Assembly.

To illustrate further our efforts in preparation for the CWC, I also wish to inform you of the establishment of a working group for preparatory work on a national committee for the future CWC. We are now in the process of forming this committee, and following its initial activities we shall inform the CD of the practical results.

As far as practical verification is concerned, I would also like to point out that we are willing to invite interested delegations, on a bilateral basis, to visit the facility presented in document CD/1048, and we are able to extend the spectrum of facilities which can be visited at other Czechoslovak establishments dealing with CW-related topics.

My delegation looks forward to and counts on the completion of our CW negotiations as soon as possible, probably this year. The revised "rolling text" provides a unique basis for redoubling our common efforts. The regrettable consequences of the events taking place in the Gulf are pushing us towards the early conclusion of the chemical weapons convention. I would like to assure the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Serguei Batsanov, the new Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, of my delegation's full support and co-operation in its further deliberations and in his very important task. At the same time I would like to express appreciation and respect to Ambassador Hyltenius and his colleagues on the Swedish delegation for the excellent work they have done during the last year. In full awareness of the importance of the words of Albert Camus - "La vraie générosité envers l'avenir, consiste à tout donner au présent" - I wish the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons much success in its future activities.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Australia, Ambassador O'Sullivan.

Mr. O'SULLIVAN (Australia): Mr. President, I am pleased to take the floor for the first time at this Conference under your presidency, in particular because of the friendly ties that have existed for so long between our two countries.

This is a sombre period in which to be assuming duties as Ambassador for Disarmament. But it is also a time when the opportunities and the necessity for disarmament and restraints on arms transfers are more apparent than ever. The war in the Gulf is a tragic reminder that the enormous improvement in the international environment which emerged in 1989 does not necessarily or inevitably lead to greater peace and stability in every region. On the contrary, one of the ironic effects of the ending of the cold war is that in regions outside Europe the security environment may well have become more complex and more difficult to calculate. The emerging world, one commentator

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

has said, "is likely to lack the clarity and stability of the cold war, and to be a more jungle-like world of multiple dangers, hidden traps, unpleasant surprises and moral ambiguities". This will be particularly so if pressures from regional arms races result in the further proliferation of conventional, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the spread of missile technology. With the experience of recent weeks, the international community will expect these questions to be addressed with renewed vigour.

Under these circumstances, the relevance and salience of the work of this Conference has increased. The threat of the use of chemical weapons in the Gulf war makes the achievement of a complete ban of chemical weapons for all times and in all environments even more urgently required. I will therefore address chemical weapons issues principally in this statement today.

The Australian Government is fully committed to a ban which would make chemical weapons illegal and which would prohibit their use. We believe our security and that of our neighbours would be enhanced by a binding multilateral commitment which assured us all that we would not face the threat of these horrible weapons. We believe that the international political conditions exist to bring such a ban into effect by concluding these negotiations. We hope in this final stage of the convention negotiations that we will recapture in 1991 the spirit that was evident two years ago at the Paris Conference and 18 months ago at the Canberra Conference, when Governments and the chemical industry committed themselves to that same objective.

We recognize however that there is a limit what officials here in Geneva may be able to achieve through the processes of negotiation and that higher-level involvement may be necessary to provide the political direction to break through the remaining problems. We therefore support calls for a meeting at ministerial level.

As we see it, the purpose of such a meeting would be to overcome political impasses in the negotiations and to give final instructions to permit the conclusion of a balanced treaty package. This requires careful preparation of the elements of such a package. It could be that we will need to prepare options so that ministers would be able to assess which proposals are both feasible in their impact on industry and credible in their contribution to collective security. A second reason for suggesting and supporting a ministerial-level meeting would be to help promote universal adherence to it. As a newcomer to this Conference I observe that there is a considerable part of the world which is not represented here. Even amongst Governments which are here represented there are different constituences in different countries which will need to be educated about the treaty. This means there is a significant "selling job" ahead of us to have a treaty supported as widely as possible amongst Governments and as broadly as possible within Governments.

Of course participation in the deliberations of this Conference is not limited to its 39 member States. We were pleased to see the Conference approve, on 31 January, the application for observer status of 34 nations. We would have been even happier if that number had been larger, particularly as we approach the final phase, of the negotiations of a multilateral chemical weapons convention.

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

Clearly one of the most efficient and productive ways to understand the objectives and the political, legal and practical implications of a future CWC is through active participation in the negotiations themselves. In practice, this opportunity has been realized by a number of observer delegations, and especially in our CWC negotiations. Observer States can and do participate both through the submission of working papers and orally in the proceedings of the CWC Ad Hoc Committee and its working groups. During the course of the negotiations in 1991 we would encourage non-member States to make known their views on specific aspects of the "rolling text" of concern to them so that they can be considered fully.

Another approach to promoting universality that has made sense to Australia has been to engage in a serious dialogue with our neighbours in the Asia/Pacific areas about this treaty and what it would imply for them. I had the privilege of being present in Brisbane in November 1990 at the second regional seminar against chemical weapons hosted by the Australian Government. There were 23 regional States present of whom only three are colleagues here in the CD; that is Indonesia, Burma and ourselves. It was apparent that there is a big gap in understanding this far-reaching and complex treaty between those of us who sit in this room and who are familiar in detail with its concepts and its specific provisions, and those busy government officials in other countries who are not here but who nevertheless will be required to undertake the considerable administrative and commercial requirements that the convention will impose.

In asking Governments to accept those requirements we need to be clear that we are delivering tangible security benefits in return. This means to our minds that the concepts and working arrangements that are embodied in the treaty particularly in the area of verification must not be designed to be so elaborate or to be required to cover such highly theoretical possibilities that they put at risk those benefits. Ultimately the treaty like all treaties can only bind with ropes of paper. If there is not the political willingness to abide by its provisions then its internal mechanisms cannot force proper behaviour on States. But on the other hand, a well-balanced, sensible, clear treaty can establish norms and give confidence to all its adherents that its benefits of enhanced security and equal commercial impact will be realized.

In order to achieve that equal commercial impact, the Australian Government has actively sought collaboration with the international chemical industry not as a partner with us here in the negotiations but as an interested and knowledgeable resource on whom much of the impact of this convention will fall. A recent example of productive Government-industry exchanges was the meeting in January 1991 in Bangkok of the ASEAN Chemical Industries Club at which a colleague from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade was able to give a presentation on the state of our negotiations here. It is also pleasing that this Conference has had further involvement with industry over the past year. And may I say that we welcome very much the ideas put forward by Sweden this morning in document CD/1053? We will examine them sympathetically and closely.

For our part, the Australian Government and the Australian chemical industry will continue to look for opportunities to continue this dialogue with our regional neighbours so that all States in our region will be well

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

prepared to become adherents to the completed convention. In this context, the Australian Government intends to host a workshop for regional chemists in Melbourne in the middle of this year with the aim of providing the necessary background and training to those technical advisers to Governments who will be required to complete declarations and assemble technical data. We are indebted to our Finnish colleagues for the model they have established and without shame we have adapted their work for our own region. May I add here that we admire the work that Dr. Rautio and her experts continue to produce? Associated with the workshop in Melbourne for regional chemists we plan to hold a multilateral trial inspection of a chemical plant there. We welcome the intention of the Governments of Venezuela and Nigeria to engage in similar exercises aimed at raising consciousness of the benefits and the requirements of the convention, and would encourage other members of this Conference to undertake similar exercises in their regions as tangible ways of soliciting support and promoting universal adherence to the concluded convention.

Australia has also been putting into place the administrative structure that will be needed once the convention comes into effect. We have found this to be no simple matter with a federal constitution and varying State and local government regulations. In the hope that our experiences may be of use to other nations, I have asked the secretariat to distribute today as a Conference document CD/1055, a strategy paper outlining how we have approached the establishment of our national chemical weapons convention secretariat, and we will look forward to the document that our Czechoslovak colleague has foreshadowed earlier this morning giving us details of Czechoslovakia's experiences in the same area.

During 1990 under the able leadership of Ambassdor Hyltenius, good progress was made in cleaning up the "rolling text" in a way which makes it internally more consistent, concise and readable. One major impediment to the cleaning-up process and to substantive progress in the negotiations has been a large number of unattributed footnotes, in many cases their authorship now unknown and raisdon d'être forgotten as the years of negotiating have rolled on. In the past the CD tradition, as I understand it, was not to attribute footnotes. The state of the negotiations is now, I believe, such that it would be useful to be able to identify the originators of footnotes in order to facilitate their removal if there is no reason for them to remain, or to help us understand more fully the authors' thinking in order to find a solution as these negotiations conclude. In brief, we propose that all delegations use the first session of this year's work in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to identify footnotes they have inserted in the "rolling text" and to transmit these to the secretariat for compilation and distrbution to all the participants. The secretariat could also assist if it is able to identify old footnotes to the extent that its records permit it do so. Any footnotes not so "claimed" should simply be deleted. Once this process has been completed, we would be in a much better position to tackle in a more purposeful way the substance of the remaining attributed footnotes.

Another matter which is of great concern to the Australian Government is that the provisions of the treaty relating to the destruction of existing chemical weapons should ensure there is a clear commitment to environmentally safe procedures. Our view is that the provisions of the convention should be developed on this point. This is a particular concern to Australia and to

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

nations of the Pacific because of the operation of the CW destruction facility at Johnston Atoll. Australia supports that facility's operations on the basis that its scope is limited to the destruction of the stockpiles currently there and that its operation continues in a manner which is fully compatible with environmental safety. This is a matter on which the Australian Prime Minister has take a direct interest and to which he is personally deeply committed.

Stepping back from the actual provisions of the "rolling text" and ways to bring these negotiations to an early conclusion Australia believes the threat posed by the spread of chemical weapons is regrettably growing and not just in the Middle East. This concern underlines the urgency of the task before us and gives particular point to our security concerns which can only be met by a multilateral, verifiable, broadly supported convention. I am pleased to advise today that Australia will be an original signatory to such a convention.

Turning briefly to other items on our agenda the Australian Government looks forward to the early re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. There is useful work to be done under its existing mandate. We wish that a comprehensive test ban be achieved at an early date and that nuclear testing become a relic of the past. We have noted that the Soviet Union and the United States and to a lesser extent France have reduced nuclear weapons tests in recent years. We consider these to be moves in the right direction. We hope the number and yields of nuclear tests continue to decline.

The cessation of nuclear testing is one of the items on the CD's agenda relevant to the broader objective of nuclear non-proliferation. We are concerned that the NPT treaty embodying the norms of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons could not be reviewed last September in a way that led to an agreed final document. We nevertheless welcome the thorough review that took place and wish to see the recommendations agreed on addressed in the International Atomic Energy Agency and elsewhere. We consider that the NPT has made a major contribution to international peace and security. It has served the security interests of its adherents. We wish to work with others to improve its functioning in the period leading up to its extension conference in 1995. We consider it vital that all members of the Treaty demonstrate through their actions and their statements that they are living up to their obligations under the Treaty and that the Treaty be extended on an assured basis. We hope that the next five years will see a greater commitment by all States to a world free of nuclear proliferation and in this regard we warmly welcome the recent statements by the Presidents of Argentina and Brazil.

We look forward to the early re-establishment of the Committee on outer space and we will continue to work fully and co-operatively with that Committee to consider how outer space can be spared an arms race. I will be dealing with this and other matters of the CD's agenda in a subsequent intervention. Finally, I take this occasion to observe that in the years since 1978 when it was established the Conference on Disarmament has grappled with its difficult mandate as the sole multilateral negotiating body set up to produce credible and workable arms control and disarmament agreements. Australia hopes that the Conference on Disarmament will be able to make a significant contribution to an enhanced world order based on the rule of law

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

and the principles of the United Nations Charter. Although much will depend on the outcome of the Gulf war, we believe this year we have the opportunity to do so through the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Australia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Germany, Ambassador Ritter von Wagner.

Mr. von WAGNER (Germany): A number of countries have reported to the Conference on Disarmament the outcome of national chemical weapons practice challenge inspections, including the Netherlands, Canada, the United Kingdom and Germany. All these exercises were intended to test the procedures that we have already worked out in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, in order to draw lessons from practical experience and thus contribute to the completion of an effective challenge inspection régime by providing a better understanding of the problems involved. Most recently Canada and the Netherlands introduced in CD/1052 the report on their joint trial challenge inspection at a military base in Germany. Today I would like to introduce, on behalf of both the United Kingdom and Germany, a report on two joint CW practice challenge inspections carried out in military facilities. The detailed report on the outcome of these exercises is tabled as document CD/1056 - working paper CD/CW/WP.330.

In view of the extensive experience both countries had already gained in the course of their previous national practice challenge inspections (PCIs), the two joint exercises, one in each country, were intended to give added realism to the PCI concept, to re-examine once more the conclusions they had reached so far, and to see what further lessons could be learned. The first exercise was held in the Federal Republic of Germany from 21 to 23 May 1990 at an air force base. The exercise was conducted under joint Anglo-German control, with the United Kingdom providing the inspection team and challenging State observer, and the Federal Republic the home team. The second exercise was held in the United Kingdom from 18 to 21 June 1990 at an ammunition storage facility. This exercise was also held under joint control, but with the roles reversed. Both countries concluded that the exercises had been conducted in a very positive and co-operative spirit, and that a number of lessons had been learned, both in confirming the conclusions that had been reached in their respective national PCIs, and in providing new insights and perspectives on the issue of challenge inspection.

Of the multitude of lessons learned, which include further practical experience in sample-taking and the use of instrumentation, like X-ray and mobile analytical equipment, and which are reported and discussed in detail in the report, let me highlight here only two of the principal conclusions drawn. Firstly, the two joint exercises have confirmed for both countries the key importance of the concept of challenge inspections, based on short notice as well as access to any challenged site, as an effective means for deterring circumvention of, as well as ensuring compliance with, the chemical weapons convention. Secondly, the joint exercises have demonstrated once more that, using managed access techniques in an intelligent and inventive way, inspectors are able to obtain the relevant information they seek, while sensitive information unrelated to chemical weapons remains protected. This has proved to be particularly true in applying the random selective access proposals elaborated in the United Kingdom paper, CD/1012.

(Mr. von Wagner, Germany)

The series of national PCIs in Germany will soon be continued in a chemical plant site, from which we expect to gain a better understanding of the problems related to the application of challenge inspections in chemical industry.

Finally, let me use this opportunity to express my gratitude to all military and civilian authorities of the United Kingdom involved in the two joint practice challenge inspections for their outstanding co-operation and support in the preparation and conduct of these exercises.

Miss SOLESBY (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): As this is the first time I take the floor under your presidency, may I begin by congratulating you on your accession to the Chair of our Conference? We are all benefiting from the wise leadership you are giving us.

The distinguished Ambassador of Germany has just introduced a report on two joint chemical weapons trial challenge inspections held by Germany and the United Kingdom (CD/1056). Ambassador von Wagner has already described this collaborative work in some detail. I would only make two comments.

First I would emphasize the excellent co-operation between the officials, German and British, who carried out the two joint trials. We for our part found working together with our German colleagues gave a most valuable additional dimension to both trials.

You may recall that prior to these two joint trials, the United Kingdom had undertaken six national trial challenge inspections, and we reported on these in CD/1012. My authorities found that the experience gained in the joint German/United Kingdom trials confirmed the earlier conclusions from our own national trials as regards both the high value of challenge inspection as part of the verification process and the efficacy of managed access techniques. Ambassador von Wagner has rightly emphasized this aspect, and I endorse what he has said. Our experience in this respect seems to have been similar both to that of our German partners and to that described in the report on the joint trial challenge inspection held by Canada and the Netherlands which was tabled by the distinguished Ambassadors of those two countries on 31 January.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for her statement and for the kind words she addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Cameroon, Ambassador Ngoubeyou.

Mr. NGOUBEYOU (Cameroon) (translated from French): First of all Mr. President, I would like to congratulate you on taking up the presidency of the Conference for the period from 22 January to 17 February 1991, and to thank you for giving me this opportunity to take the floor in this august assembly.

As a result of the remarkable improvement in relations between Washington and Moscow, the sudden acceleration of history in Central and Eastern Europe, the glimmers of hope in Asia and elsewhere, despite the Gulf conflict, and the revival of multilateralism, the Conference is being held this year in an exceptional international climate. This improvement in the international

(Mr. Ngoubeyou, Cameroon)

climate, which is founded on the political will of all States and the taking into account of the legitimate interests of each group of States, should enable the international community, and in particular the Conference on Disarmament, to undertake a thorough examination of the various aspects of the issue of disarmament, at a time when the goals, purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations call our attention to our duty to save future generations from the scourge of war.

Cameroon, which welcomes the positive and encouraging course of the negotiations between the two super-Powers, as well as the important agreements recently concluded in Paris to guarantee security, peace and co-operation in Europe, remains dedicated to the purposes and principles proclaimed in the Charter and attaches special importance to disarmament and the maintenance of peace. In this connection the recent measures taken by the Conference on Disarmament to improve its functioning, involving the amendment of rules 7, 9 and 28 of the rules of procedure, should be noted with satisfaction. We are also gratified by the fact that at its first plenary in 1991 the Conference decided, in response to the wishes of the overwhelming majority of States, to continue consideration of the item concerning its improved and effective functioning and to report on the matter to the General Assembly of the United Nations at its forty-sixth session. It is important for the Conference on Disarmament, which remains the international community's sole multilateral forum for disarmament negotiations, to acquire the means to implement its mandate effectively, intensify its work and adopt concrete measures on specific priority disarmament issues which have been on its agenda for years, in accordance with the Programme of Action set out in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly. The Conference should also reflect the present composition of the international community so that all the elements in it are able to make their contribution to the cause of peace. In accordance with paragraphs 14 and 15 of its report (CD/1039), the Conference will be intensifying its consultations with a view to taking a positive decision at this session on the expansion of the membership of the Conference by not more than four States, taking into account the need to keep a balance in its membership, and will inform the General Assembly of the United Nations of its decision at its forty-sixth session. Cameroon strongly supports the determination of the members of the Conference to settle this question of the admission of new States quickly and fairly. Likewise, we hope that participation by and contributions from non-member States in the work of the Conference will continue to be encouraged.

The question of a nuclear test ban has been on the Conference's agenda virtually since its inception. This complex issue lies at the core of the efforts being made by the international community, bearing in mind that a comprehensive test ban would put an end to the qualitative improvement of existing arsenals and help decisively to curb the nuclear arms race. Despite intensive and painstaking negotiations during the fourth NPT review conference and the PTBT Amendment Conference, no agreement was reached on a legal instrument banning all nuclear testing in all environments for all time. In view of the importance of this question in the disarmament process, its links with the question of the extension of the NPT and its relationship with the problem of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, it is important that the Conference on Disarmament, in accordance with General Assembly

(Mr. Ngoubeyou, Cameroon)

resolutions 45/49 and 45/51, should be able to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban during this session to carry forward the work begun in the Conference in 1990, focusing on substantive work on specific and interrelated test-ban issues, including the structure and scope of the future test-ban treaty as well as verification and compliance with obligations freely entered into.

Turning to chemical weapons, I should point out that the report presented by Ambassador Hyltenius, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, shows the substantial progress that has been achieved in the elaboration of the draft convention on chemical weapons. Here we would like to congratulate Ambassador Hyltenius for his tremendous contribution. The importance of such a legal instrument in formalizing the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, particularly in the light of events in the Gulf, needs no further demonstration. That is why we hope that under the enlightened guidance of Ambassador Batsanov, the Ad Hoc Committee will make every effort to settle the highly complex political and technical questions that have still to be resolved and reach agreement on the substance of this international convention which we have awaited with such impatience. The Cameroonian delegation, which will again be participating in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee this year, will make its modest contribution to the search for compromise solutions.

Here it is appropriate to stress the value of CW trial inspections such as those carried out jointly at the Canadian military base at Lahr in Germany by the Netherlands and Canada. Such trials make it possible to verify the applicability of the provisions of the protocol on inspection procedures, to initiate participants into techniques for implementing the future convention and to promote understanding among States. We hope that the Conference will be in a position to achieve concrete progress in finalizing the text of the convention on chemical weapons. Likewise, since there is no fundamental objection in the Conference to the idea of an international convention aimed at providing non-nuclear-weapon States with assurances against the use or threat of use of such weapons, even if the difficulties involved in developing a common approach are still great, Cameroon hopes that the members of the Conference will redouble their efforts to study further the different approaches that have been envisaged in order to overcome the difficulties, reach an agreement as soon as possible and conclude effective international arrangements relating to the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

Other important questions are on the Conference's agenda for the 1991 session. They relate in particular to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, radiological weapons and the comprehensive programme of disarmament. On all these substantive issues, to which the international community is quite rightly giving attention in the quest for general and complete disarmament under effective international control and in the promotion of peace, security and development, my delegation will be making its contribution in due course, either in the form of statements in plenary or during consultations in the ad hoc committees.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Cameroon for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Loeis.

Mr. LOEIS (Indonesia): At the outset, let me join the previous speakers in paying tribute to the very important statement made by the Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mr. Ali Akbar Velayati. I am sure that his presence and his message will give more impetus to our deliberations in the Conference.

Sir, I would like to express our pleasure at seeing you, the representative of a country with which Indonesia has always had excellent relations, presiding over the Conference. I am confident that under your stewardship we shall achieve substantive progress in our work. I would like to take this opportunity to commend your distinguished predecessor, Dr. Gheorghe Chirila of Romania, for the very competent manner in which he guided us during the last part of our session last year.

I wish every success to those colleagues who have left us since I last addressed the Conference - Ambassador Ait Chaalal of Algeria, Ambassador Reese of Australia, Ambassador Kostov of Bulgaria, Ambassador Pierre Morel of France, Ambassador Sujka of Poland, Ambassador Kosin of Yugoslavia and, finally, Ambassador Peter Dietze, who was the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic before unification. I extend a warm welcome to our new colleagues, the Ambassadors of Yugoslavia, Algeria, Australia, Bulgaria and Poland. We look forward to working in close co-operation with them in the future.

While the dramatic and unprecedented international changes which overshadowed the sessions of the Conference of last year and 1989 have been widely discussed, I venture to say that this session of the Conference is taking place during the most disturbing international event of the era since the Second World War. Never during its existence has the session of the Conference been confronted with such a human tragedy as the war in the Gulf, from which we are already hearing stories of devastation, fear and suffering. In this connection, allow me to touch upon matters which are pertinent to our deliberations at this given time, and to refer to the circumstances from the point of view of a member of the Conference from a region which has had much experience of the evils of conflicts and power rivalries. First and foremost, I believe that the Conference has been provided with a convincing indication as to the importance of the role that the Conference should play in contributing to the international endeavours towards the achievement of international peace and security, based on the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. It should not lose sight of its task, which is that of negotiating measures to halt and reverse the arms race in a multilateral sense, towards general and complete disarmament. The evidence of the devasting effects of the use of weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons in the past, already great enough, is being compounded by further evidence from the present armed conflict.

I could not agree more with the Secretary-General of the United Nations that, as he said in his message a few days ago, the endeavour towards disarmament needs to be pursued at a faster pace, in a more global and

(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

comprehensive way, as part of a reliable and consistent system of undiminished security for all. A great number of resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly on matters related to disarmament have reflected the common quest of all Members of the United Nations for lasting international peace and security through practical measures of disarmament. Indeed, the dark cloud resulting from the smoke of munitions a long way from this room should be giving us a strong signal to speed up our deliberations.

Resolution 45/49 of the United Nations General Assembly appeals to all member States of the Conference on Disarmament to "promote" the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, at the beginning of its 1991 session, with the objective of carrying out multilateral negotiations for a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear test explosions. The General Assembly recommends that the Ad Hoc Committee should comprise two working groups dealing with the following interrelated questions: firstly the contents and scope of the treaty, and secondly compliance and verification. United Nations General Assembly resolution 45/51 also urges the Conference, inter alia, in addition to re-establishing the Ad Hoc Committee on an NTB, to take into account the progress achieved by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, including work on the routine exchange and use of wave-form data, and other relevant initiatives or experiments carried out by individual States and groups of States.

Over the years, the General Assembly has adopted numerous resolutions calling for a comprehensive test ban so as to achieve the goal of a comprehensive nuclear-weapon test-ban treaty. At the risk of being repetitive, let me restate that the preambles to the partial test-ban Treaty and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, two treaties which my country strictly adheres to, stipulate that the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons by all States in all environments for all time is a fundamental goal to be realized. The recently concluded PTBT Amendment Conference revealed certain elements which might be beneficial for the work of the Conference in pursuing the goal mentioned earlier. Considering these recent developments, the Conference is at the moment gaining momentum in its endeavours toward the achievement of a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

At the PTBT Amendment Conference, it was widely held that the Amendment Conference produced a stronger international commitment to a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Some constructive ideas were also outlined - among other things, a suggestion that the verification proposals presented to the Amendment Conference, including the draft protocol proposed by the co-sponsors of the Amendment Conference, should be transmitted to the Conference on Disarmament for further consideration. For the benefit of our deliberations at this forum this suggestion should be given adequate consideration.

Confidence in the technical aspects of verification as a determining factor which can motivate the cessation of nuclear weapon testing by nuclear-weapon States is of great significance, as was pointed out by a number of delegations during the Amendment Conference. There were also many convincing arguments to the effect that the available techniques of verification, both national and international, are sufficient to sustain a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It was pointed out at the Amendment Conference

(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

that scientific evidence proves sufficient for a nuclear test ban verification system, taking advantage of currently available technological and scientific means.

A large number of delegations at the Amendment Conference suggested that seismic monitoring has a vital role to play in the verification system of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. There was, however, widespread recognition that seismic monitoring may not be adequate to instil confidence in a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In this regard, some delegations welcomed the various proposals made in the Amendment Conference concerning the monitoring of airborne radiation, satellite surveillance and on-site inspection, which all merit further consideration. The importance of the work being undertaken by the Group of Scientific Experts on seismic events was also emphasized during the Amendment Conference.

As for the institutional aspect of the envisaged comprehensive nuclear test-ban régime, some suggested at the Amendment Conference that the proposal concerning verification should be presented to the Conference on Disarmament so that it might be further elaborated. From the perspective of the work of the Conference on Disarmament, such a proposal is encouraging. It provides evidence that the Conference on Disarmament, and especially its Group of Scientific Experts, is considered by States parties to the Treaty as worthy to deal with the question of verification of the nuclear test ban. It is only natural therefore that the Conference on Disarmament should resume and increase the substantive work it initiated last year in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban with renewed determination and vigour. Since the question of a nuclear test ban is of paramount importance for the Conference to deal with, my delegation would wish the Conference to have an opportunity to assess the work undertaken at the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban by the end of the Conference's session.

In touching upon the elaboration of the comprehensive nuclear test-ban régime, I wish to underline one of the most crucial points made by the Group of 21 during last year's session of the Conference. It was stressed that such a comprehensive nuclear test-ban régime should be non-discriminatory and comprehensive in character so as to attract universal adherence. It should include a verification system that is universal in its application and non-discriminatory in its nature, and guarantees equal access to all States. My delegation is of the belief that a test-ban régime which confers exclusive rights on any States to continue to carry out nuclear testing would inevitably be met with suspicion and mistrust by others which are not accorded equal rights.

Referring to item 4 of our agenda, let me begin by saying that my delegation's basic position was well reflected in the statement of the distinguished delegate of Peru on behalf of the Group of 21 a few days ago. The future convention, while safeguarding civilian chemical industry and promoting international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of chemicals, must in the first place be designed to achieve the total destruction of existing arsenals and outlaw the use of these abhorrent weapons. Given the long-standing loathing of these weapons by the world community, which is now increased by the threat of the possible use of these

(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

weapons on the battlefield during the present war, the Conference now faces the critical historic task of bringing about a treaty banning the use, possession, production and development of these weapons.

There are some issues left to be solved in order to conclude the convention. The main task at the current session of the Conference, as far as chemical weapons are concerned, is that of finding solutions in principle to those few issues where there is as yet no agreement, mainly the question of universal adherence. For this purpose the future convention must provide for systematic and total destruction of all chemical weapons within a specific period. The legitimate concern for the security of non-possessor States should be addressed in a way which ensures that the implementation of the convention will not create any new imbalance which might undermine their security concerns. Those States which do not possess or intend to possess chemical weapons for their military and defence purposes, which I believe comprises the majority of States in the globe, should not be in the position of being caught off guard and finding that, at the end of the destruction period, certain States parties are allowed to retain their chemical weapons stocks. My delegation will find it difficult to support a draft convention which permits the existence of these weapons. The political cost of protesting at a later stage will be too high for a country like mine, which has so far scrupulously observed its obligations under any treaty relating to disarmament.

Indonesia has consistently supported the role played by the United Nations in the maintenance of peace and security at regional as well as global levels. For that reason, the Government of the Republic of Indonesia hosted the United Nations Regional Disarmament Workshop for Asia and the Pacific in Bandung from 28 January to 1 February 1991. The convening of the workshop, in co-operation with the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, took place under the mandate of United Nations General Assembly resolution 40/151 H. The programme for this workshop covered a wide range of issues which are of deep concern to the entire world. These include peace and security in Asia and the Pacific, global disarmament to strengthen the régime of the non-proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, the chemical weapons convention, regional disarmament efforts and a proposal to strengthen the non-proliferation régime and conflict resolution in the Asia-Pacific region. I am hopeful that the results of these deliberations will contribute substantially to the region's comprehension of these issues, and more specifically that it will also contribute to the implementation of United Nations General Assembly resolution 40/151 H concerning the promotion of regional disarmament training and advisory services.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Indonesia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Peru, Ambassador de Rivero.

Mr. de RIVERO (Peru) (translated from Spanish): My delegation has asked to take the floor this morning in order to refer to agenda item 1, Nuclear test ban. According to the final declaration of the first session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament, this item is of the highest priority, and that has been my country's view for many years. This Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating forum on

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

disarmament, has the mandate from the international community to carry out concrete and substantive negotiations. On many occasions in this very body Peru has restated the urgent need to initiate negotiations with a view to bringing about, in the shortest possible time, a complete nuclear test ban valid for all environments and all forms. The fact that to date the Conference on Disarmament has been unable to satisfy this just demand, which is a response to the democratic outcry of the overwhelming majority of the countries of the world and the man in the street, indisputably calls into question the binding nature of this sole multilateral negotiating forum which in 1978 received by consensus a clear and emphatic mandate from the United Nations General Assembly to negotiate agreements in the area of disarmament on matters of particular importance for the cessation of the nuclear arms race.

There is no valid reason to justify the indefinite postponement of the start of negotiations. Nor are member States of the Conference on Disarmament in a position to sacrifice deep-seated positions of principle, based on democratic sentiments of their peoples, while awaiting the bon vouloir of one or two delegations. Starting negotiations on a CTBT does not necessarily oblige member States of the Conference on Disarmament to conclude a treaty in six months or a year. As in the area of chemical weapons, where nobody doubts the good faith of the States that are represented here, negotiations on a CTBT could very well take a few years to reconcile positions that are still divergent as regards the structure and scope of the future CTBT. Nevertheless, my delegation is concerned that a degree of intolerance and inflexibility persists with regard to a matter that would in no way tie the hands of member States, but does definitely jeopardize the realization of an aspiration that is based on international law and the demands of the peoples of other countries and the obligations incumbent on members of the Conference on Disarmament.

In 1990, Peru joined the last-minute consensus that allowed the Ad Hoc Committee on agenda item 1, Nuclear test ban, to be established. On that occasion my delegation, along with the distinguished delegations of the Group of 21, was practically forced to make a major concession: it left in abeyance its position contained in document CD/829, which was the result of a mature and responsible decision by the group on the comprehensive nuclear test ban. This made it possible for a preliminary exchange of views to take place under the chairmanship of the distinguished Ambassador Donowaki, which had the virtue of bringing the discussions up to date. At the same time consultations on the work programme were carried out as the best way to facilitate matters for this year. At the end of the exercise my delegation was amongst those that were surprised at the reluctance of one group to include in the final report of the Ad Hoc Committee an unequivocal reference to its re-establishment at the beginning of the 1991 session. So we had to agree to a report that in the end subordinated the fate of the Ad Hoc Committee to the outcome of the fourth NPT review conference and the PTBT Amendment Conference. Yet again the Group of 21 was presented with a fait accompli and faced, in addition to the immediate negotiation of a CTBT, the problem of the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee.

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

During the fourth NPT review conference an offer was made for the immediate re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee as a way of avoiding a commitment to begin immediate negotiations on a CTBT. And the review conference was unable to adopt a final declaration precisely for that reason. A similar situation was seen in the PTBT Amendment Conference, which was unable to find a formula which would enable us to respond to the justified expectations of the non-nuclear-weapon States. So matters continue, and we find ourselves in this Conference virtually obliged not to negotiate, lacking any alternative but to repeat the exercise of 1982 and 1983, with the difference that in 1995 - that is to say, very soon - the States parties to the NPT will have to take a decision on the number of years that the Treaty should continue in force. This year we will have to decide at the forthcoming General Assembly on the date when the work of the Preparatory Committee for the NPT extension conference should start. And it is precisely because of these time constraints that the Conference on Disarmament must make an exceptional effort to enable immediate negotiations to take place.

As I have already said, negotiating does not mean concluding a treaty immediately. Negotiating - a negotiating mandate - is first and foremost a political gesture to reaffirm good faith in complying with commitments entered into. When, in article I, paragraph 3, of the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, the United States and the Soviet Union undertook to continue their negotiations with a view toward achieving a solution to the problem of the cessation of all underground nuclear weapon tests, it is clear that they did not rule out negotiations in the multilateral arena, and it is the unwillingness to start such negotiations that is now untenable, even though the cessation of nuclear tests is still considered a longer-term objective.

This morning my delegation cannot but place on record its dissatisfaction at the serious setbacks facing the Conference on Disarmament in carrying out the mandate with regard to agenda item 1. In view of the important deadlines that we have ahead of us in the next few years, my delegation is prepared for this year, and for this year alone, to join the consensus regading the mandate adopted last year. However, my delegation believes that this situation involving deliberations but no negotiations on an item of the highest priority cannot be perpetuated in the future. It will be necessary to provide for a start to negotiations on a CTBT at the very latest by next year, in 1992, if this Conference wishes to form part of a new international order and to keep its status as the sole multilateral negotiating forum.

In this life everything has an end and nothing, absolutely nothing, can remain unchangeable indefinitely.

The PRESIDENT: That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other representative wish to take the floor?

As I announced at the opening of this plenary meeting, I shall now put before the Conference for action a number of decisions relating to organizational arrangements under agenda items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. We shall proceed in the order in which the items appear on our agenda. Accordingly, we shall begin with agenda item 1, entitled "Nuclear test ban". In that connection, the secretariat has circulated today a draft decision on the

(The President)

re-establishment of an ad hoc Committee to deal with that item. The draft decision appears in document CD/WP.403. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I now wish to invite the Conference to appoint the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. I am informed that there is consensus on the appointment of Ambassador Indrajit Singh Chadha of India as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. Shall I take it that the Conference so decides?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I extend to Ambassador Chadha, on behalf of the Conference, our congratulations on his appointment to the important post of Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee and wish him every success in discharging his heavy responsibilities.

In connection with the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on item 1, I wish to recall that Ambassador Donowaki of Japan very kindly made himself available to help in the process of informal consultations on the programme of work of the Committee. I am grateful for the assistance provided by Ambassador Donowaki in that respect and I am sure that the work he performed on that subject will be very helpful to the incoming Chairman.

I now give the floor to the representative of Brazil, who will speak as Co-ordinator of the Group of 21 on this item.

Mr. RICUPERO (Brazil): The conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty is the most urgent item on the agenda of this Conference and is long overdue. This Conference, as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, has the primary role in negotiations to achieve that objective. The need for a nuclear test-ban treaty has been repeatedly emphasized in numerous documents adopted unanimously by the United Nations, including the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. As a significant contribution to the aim of halting and reversing the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, the Group of 21 has consistently advocated and has continued to attach the highest priority to a nuclear test ban.

In a spirit of compromise and flexibility, and in order to facilitate the setting up of an ad hoc committee on item 1 in the Conference on Disarmament, the Group of 21 did not object to document CD/863 being taken as the basis for the mandate of the Committee when it was established late in the 1990 session of the CD. This acceptance was without prejudice to its continuing preference for the mandate contained in document CD/829.

We accept that the Ad Hoc Committee will now be able to resume its work. Its mandate, however, continues to be much below the expectations of the Group of 21. The Group exceptionally accepts the present mandate, and such acceptance does not imply that the Ad Hoc Committee should be allowed to work indefinitely on the same basis. The Group believes that a clear negotiating

(Mr. Ricupero, Brazil)

mandate is necessary to ensure the conclusion of a nuclear test-ban treaty which will play a fundamental role in contributing to the cause of disarmament.

It should be recalled that the achievement of a nuclear test-ban treaty was envisaged in the preamble to the partial test-ban treaty of 1963, which embodied the objective of continuing negotiations "to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time".

The Group of 21 would like to put on record that it accepts the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban on the basis of last year's mandate only for this year, in order to allow it to begin its work as soon as possible. It does so on the understanding that the results of the Committee's work and its mandate will be reviewed at the end of our session.

In recognizing the efforts of Ambassador Donowaki of Japan, we should like to congratulate Ambassador Chadha of India on his election to chair the Ad Hoc Committee this year.

Mr. CHADHA (India): Mr. President, I would like to begin by extending to you, on behalf of my delegation, our warmest felicitations on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament during a crucial phase of its work, and our best wishes for success in the task that lies ahead. I would also like to join earlier speakers in thanking His Excellency the Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran for the thought-provoking address which we were privileged to hear this morning.

I am indeed greatly honoured by the trust and confidence which has been reposed in me by electing me as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban". It will be my endeavour to carry forward the task so ably initiated by Ambassador Donowaki last year, to the best of my ability; and I am confident that in doing so I can count on the support and co-operation of the members of the CD as well as of the secretariat. I would like to take this opportunity to pay a warm tribute to Ambassador Donowaki for the outstanding leadership he provided during the formative stages of the work of the Committee upon its re-establishment last year.

The task which has been assigned to this Committee is of great importance and, at the same time, of enormous complexity with far-reaching political implications. This is abundantly clear from the fact that it took us so long to agree upon the new mandate of the Committee, which was able to resume its work after a long gap of seven years. That we were eventually able to resolve our differences bears testimony not only to the importance which the members of the CD attach at the present juncture of international relations to the resumption of work in this area, but also to their willingness to accommodate the points of view of one another. It is my earnest hope that the same spirit of compromise, co-operation and flexibility which characterized the negotiations on the mandate will continue to prevail in the future and will facilitate the accomplishment of our task.

In reviving this Committee last year, we reaffirmed our commitment to the goal of a comprehensive test ban. The attainment of this goal will call for dedicated work and renewed determination to overcome the obstacles which still

(Mr. Chadha, India)

remain. Our deliberations will be followed with considerable interest by all those who are dedicated to the cause of disarmament and peace; and I hope that we shall not disappoint them.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of India for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. Does any other member wish to take the floor at this stage? I see none.

We shall now proceed to consider agenda items 2 and 3. As I informed you at our last plenary meeting, consensus has been reached on an organizational arrangement to deal with these agenda items. I shall now follow a procedure identical to that used last year to formalize the consensus. I therefore put before the Conference for decision the following text:

> "The Conference on Disarmament decides that informal meetings be held during its 1991 session on the substance of agenda items 2, 'Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament', and 3, 'Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters', and that the discussions at those informal meetings be duly reflected in the annual report of the Conference to the General Assembly of the United Nations."

If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the text that I have just read out.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I should like now to turn to another subject relating to the forthcoming informal meetings. Under the rules of procedure, the President of the Conference has the responsibility, in accordance with the normal duties of any presiding officer, to ensure that discussions at plenary or informal meetings are conducted in an orderly way. Accordingly, I wish to inform you that I have myself taken the initative of preparing a list of topics for the prupose of facilitating a structured discussion at informal meetings on the substance of agenda items 2 and 3. That list is my own and therefore does not bind any delegation. Furthermore, it is understood that members wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the agenda items, as is the normal practice of the Conference. I shall now read out that list of topics:

Firstly, for agenda item 2:

Implementation of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of SSOD-I in the light of the trends in international relations

Evaluation of the dynamics of the nuclear arms race in the light of recent international developments

The nuclear arms race in all its qualitative aspects, and related matters

Existing international instruments concerning the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament

(The President)

The interrelation between bilateral and multilateral consideration of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; participation in negotiations for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; prerequisites for the participation of all nuclear-weapon States in nuclear disarmament; role of the Conference on Disarmament

Security concepts relating to nuclear weapons in view of recent developments and in the light of the global consequences of existing and envisaged disarmament and arms limitation agreements

The role of nuclear deterrence in keeping the peace for 40 years: the need to proceed carefully and gradually in reducing reliance on nuclear deterrence

Principles governing nuclear disarmament

Proposals on stages and measures of nuclear disarmament

Cessation of the production of fissionable matterial for weapons purposes, and measures against the reuse for weapons purposes of fissionable material released by disarmament steps

Naval nuclear armaments and disarmament

Collateral measures with the aim of consolidating and continuing the ongoing process of nuclear disarmament:

Non-proliferation of missiles and other means of delivery of nuclear weapons, as well as their technology

Confidence-building measures promoting nuclear disarmament

Verification in relation to the purposes, scope and nature of agreements

Existing proposals.

Secondly, for agenda item 3:

The impossibility of separating the problems of preventing nuclear war and preventing any war

Measures to exclude the use of nuclear weapons, inter alia:

Paragraph 58 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (code of peaceful conduct that would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons)

International convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances (text annexed to General Assembly resolution 43/76 E of 7 December 1988)

Prohibition in a legally binding form of the use of nuclear weapons

(The President)

Measures for confidence-building and crisis prevention:

Measures to enhance confidence and increase openness with regard to military activities, including a multilateral agreement on the prevention of incidents on the high seas

Measures to prevent accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and to avoid and manage crisis situations, including the establishment of multilateral nuclear alert and crisis control centres

Measures to facilitate the international verification of compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements

Criteria and parameters for defensive military postures; military strategies and doctrines; prevention of surprise attacks

New trends in weapons technology and their impact on security and disarmament efforts.

This is the list of topics that I have prepared on my own responsibility.

I now give the floor to the representative of India, Ambassador Chadha, as Co-ordinator of the Group of 21 on item 2.

Mr. CHADHA (India): The significance which the Group of 21 attaches to agenda item 2 - Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament - is well known, and its views are already reflected in documents CD/64, CD/116, CD/180, CD/526 and CD/819. In keeping with its consistent position, the Group of 21 presented the draft mandate contained in CD/819/Rev.1 on 27 July 1989. It is a mandate that reflects the two crucial aspects of this issue - the urgency that the issue demands and the need to deal with it in the multilateral negotiating framework of the Conference on Disarmament.

Resolution 45/62 C adopted at the forty-fifth United Nations General Assembly session requests the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee at the beginning of its 1991 session on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament with an adequate mandate in order to allow a structured and practical analysis of how the Conference can best contribute to progress on this urgent matter. Resolution 45/59 D, also adopted at the forty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly, calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to agree, through a joint declaration, to a comprehensive nuclear arms freeze, which would embrace, besides a comprehensive test ban on nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, the complete cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes under appropriate and effective measures and procedures for verification. The General Assembly, through these widely supported resolutions, has requested the Conference on Disarmament to submit a report to its forty-sixth session on the implementation of these resolutions. The Group of 21 regrets that despite the preliminary work carried out on the subject during previous years, it has still not been found possible to set up an ad hoc committee on this item.

(Mr. Chadha, India)

In keeping with the discussions that took place on this item in previous years, and as reflected in the report of the CD contained in document CD/1039, the Group of 21 is convinced that the need for urgent multilateral action on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, leading to the adoption of concrete measures, has been amply demonstrated. In its opinion, multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament have long been overdue. It takes note of the progress achieved in the bilateral negotiations in the nuclear field and looks forward to further reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals in the context of the START process. However, bilateral negotiations can never replace or nullify the genuine multilateral search for universally applicable nuclear disarmament measures. All nations have a vital interest in negotiations on nuclear disarmament. The existence of nuclear weapons and their quantitative and qualitative development directly and fundamentally jeopardize the vital security interests of both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. It is an accepted fact that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and the survival of civilization.

The present international situation and the easing of tensions between East and West lends further credence to the long-standing demand of an overwhelming majority of the world community to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects, and to adopt urgent measures for nuclear disarmament through a time-bound programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

The accumulation of nuclear weaponry constitutes a threat to the very security that it seeks to protect. In the nuclear age, the only valid doctrine is the achievement of collective security through nuclear disarmament. As long as doctrines of nuclear deterrence are persisted with, a nuclear arms race which leads to greater insecurity and instability in international relations cannot be halted and reversed. Moreover, such doctrines, which in the ultimate analysis are predicated upon a willingness to use nuclear weapons, cannot be the basis for preventing the outbreak of a nuclear war, a war which would affect participants and innocent bystanders alike. The Group wishes to reiterate the validity of General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI) of 1961, which declared, inter alia, that the use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to the laws of humanity and a crime against civilization.

In the task of achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament, the nuclear-weapon States bear a special responsibility. In keeping with respect for the security concerns of non-nuclear States, all nuclear-weapon States must accept the obligation to take positive and practical steps towards the adoption and implementation of concrete measures towards nuclear disarmament.

The realization that a nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought is a significant step forward, which must be translated into practical steps. Paragraph 50 of the Final Document of SSOD-I sets out guidelines for the CD to provide an effective and complementary process in the multilateral framework. The Group of 21 remains firmly committed to the implementation of the provisions of this paragraph and believes that the establishment of an ad hoc committee in the CD provides the best means to achieve this objective. The Group of 21 stresses that its willingness to accept the format of the informal plenary to discuss this agenda item this year in no way prejudices

(Mr. Chadha, India)

its principled stand reflected in CD/64, CD/116, CD/180, CD/526, CD/819 and CD/819/Rev.1. The Group expects substantial movement on the issue of setting up an ad hoc committee on this agenda item next year, in keeping with the importance of the subject within the global disarmament agenda.

The PRESIDENT: I now give the floor to the representative of Kenya, Ambassador Ogada, as Co-ordinator for the Group of 21 on item 3.

Mr. OGADA (Kenya): Mr. President, as this is the first time I have taken the floor during your presidency, may I congratulate you for the very effective and efficient manner in which you have guided the work of the Conference since the commencement of its 1991 session? As the same time, my delegation would also like to thank His Excellency Dr. Velayati, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, for his illuminating statement on the Gulf crisis.

I have asked for the floor today to make a statement on behalf of the Group of 21 with regard to agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters".

The Group of 21 wishes to express its regret at the inability of the Conference on Disarmament to set up an ad hoc committee on agenda item 3. The Group has shown itself ready to exchange views on this subject, here or in the General Assembly. But some delegations have not agreed with this, as their priorities seem to be different.

I do not need to emphasize the importance that the Group of 21 attaches to this item. The Group believes that the greatest peril facing the world is the threat of destruction from a nuclear war, and that consequently the removal of this threat is most acute and urgent. Nuclear-weapon States possess the primary responsibility for avoiding nuclear war, but all nations have a vital interest in the negotiation of measures for prevention of nuclear war, in view of the catastrophic consequences that such a war would have for mankind. As far back as 1961, General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI) declared that the use of nuclear weapons, besides being a violation of the Charter of the United Nations, would be against the laws of humanity and a crime against civilization. Keeping this in view the Belgrade Declaration, adopted in September 1989 at the Ninth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, emphasized the extreme urgency of achieving nuclear disarmament through the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and "stressed the need for the conclusion of an international agreement prohibiting all use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances".

It is matter of concern for all delegations present here that no progress has been possible on this item since its introduction as a separate item on the CD's agenda in accordance with General Assembly resolution 38/183 G. During these years the arms race has accelerated, leading to the expansion of nuclear weapon stockpiles and the introduction of still more lethal warheads into them.

The United Nations General Assembly has repeatedly requested the Conference on Disarmament to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical

(Mr. Ogada, Kenya)

measures for the prevention of nuclear war and to establish for that purpose an ad hoc committee on this subject. During the 1990 session of the General Assembly there were two resolutions on this subject which were adopted by overwhelming majorities. One of these resolutions, 45/59 B on a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, reiterated the call to the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations, as a matter of priority, in order to reach agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, taking as a basis for its work the draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons annexed to the resolution.

In view of the irreversible consequences of a nuclear war, it is clear that conventional wars cannot under any circumstances be equated with nuclear war, since nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction. In this context, invoking the Charter to justify the use of nuclear weapons in the exercise of the right to self-defence is completely unjustifiable. The Group of 21 remains convinced that the shortest way to remove the danger of nuclear war lies in the elimination of nuclear weapons, and that pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should be prohibited. It has welcomed the declaration by then President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in November 1985 that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought", as also its reconfirmation in the joint statements issued subsequently. Now is the time to translate this will into a binding commitment.

The Group of 21 remains committed to the position expressed in CD/515/Rev.5 of 27 July 1989 for the establishment of an ad hoc committee that will permit thcrough consideration of all aspects - legal, political, technical and military - of all the proposals before the Conference. It believes that such consideration will not only contribute to better understanding of the subject but also pave the way for negotations for an agreement on the prevention of nuclear war. Such an objective cannot be achieved only through discussions in the plenary or informal meetings. The Group is disappointed, therefore, that despite the urgency accorded to this subject and the flexibility it has displayed, the Conference on Disarmament is not able to discharge its own mandate, which is reflected in paragraph 120 of the Final Document of SSOD-I. However, the Group of 21 is prepared to start consideration of this item in informal plenary meetings in the hope that the importance of the matter will lead to a rethinking on the part of those who have expressed reservations on the mandate proposed by the Group of 21.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Kenya for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. Are there any further comments in connection with items 2 and 3? It seems not.

I wish to inform you that the informal meetings referred to will be devoted alternately to agenda item 2 and agenda item 3. We shall hold the first informal meeting on Thursday, 21 February, immediately after the plenary meeting on that date. As a rule, we shall deal with one agenda item per week, on the understanding that if for any reason we have no time to listen to all speakers listed for a particular day, we shall continue at the end of the following plenary meeting. Members wishing to place their names on the list in advance may do so, but this is not necessary.

(The President)

I should like now to turn to agenda item 4. The secretariat has also circulated today a draft decision which is contained in document CD/WP.401, concerning the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I now put document CD/WP.401 before the Conference for decision. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I now turn to the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee. I understand that there is consensus on the appointment of Minister Serguei Batsanov of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. I invite you to formalize that decision.

It was do decided.

The PRESIDENT: I wish to extend congratulations to Minister Batsanov on behalf of the Conference on his appointment to the chairmanship of that subsidiary body. I further wish him a successful tenure of office in the negotations on one of the priority items on our agenda.

I now give the floor to the representative of Peru, as Co-ordinator for the Group of 21 on item 4.

Mr. CALDERON (Peru) (translated from Spanish): On behalf of the Group of 21, I would like to make the following statement with regard to the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. With your permission, Mr. President, I shall read out the statement in English.

(continued in English)

"On 7 February 1991 the Group of 21 made a statement with regard to the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. It set forth its position in relation to the necessity of including the question of the total prohibition of use of chemical weapons in the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons that we have just re-established. The Group of 21 has joined the consensus this morning on the draft mandate proposed in order to ensure the prompt resumption of the important work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. However, we deeply regret that the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons does not include specific reference to the prohibition of use of chemical weapons. The Group of 21 continues to believe that, as the draft convention covers the issue of the prohibition of use, this should also be clearly reflected in the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee."

Mr. ANTYUKHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, since the delegation of the USSR is taking the floor for the first time at today's session of the Conference on Disarmament, we would like at the outset to welcome you most sincerely to your present responsible post. The delegation of the USSR has been aquainted with you for a long time now as we have worked together in the field of multilateral disarmament, and in the time that has elapsed since the opening of the present session, we have had the opportunity to see for ourselves once again the skilful, purposeful and tactful way you have been steering the work of the

(Mr. Antyukhin, USSR)

Conference. I would like to assure you that the Soviet delegation will fully support you in your work. At the same time, we would like to welcome the new heads of delegation - Ambassadors A. Semichi, P. O'Sullivan, T. Ditchev, T. Tóth, D.E. Baljinnyam and N. Calovski. We wish them every success in performing their responsible tasks. We would also ask the delegations of Algeria, Australia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, France and Yugoslavia to convey our very best wishes to Ambassadors M.A. Chaalal, D. Reese, I. Varga, L. Bayart, B. Sujka, G. Chirila, P. Morel and M. Kosin, who have returned home.

In connection with the decision just adopted by the Conference, to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and appoint the head of the Soviet delegation, S.B. Batsanov, as Chairman of the Committee for the coming year, the Soviet delegation would like to express its deepest gratitude to all delegations for the great confidence that they have placed in us.

S.B. Batsanov has asked me to convey to you that he regards this appointment first and foremost as a recognition of the role which the Soviet Union is playing both in the talks aimed at the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and in the efforts being made by the international community in other fields of arms limitation and disarmament. He has asked me to assure all the distinguished representatives that he will make every effort to ensure that 1991 is a year of substantial progress towards a decision on what we view as one of the most urgent items on the agenda of the Conference - saving mankind from the threat of chemical warfare. The urgency of this task is confirmed by the dramatic events which are now occurring in the Persian Gulf region. The delegation of the USSR listened carefully to the substantive statement made by the distinguished Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati. It contains a number of points which all of us should give serious thought to. Furthermore, the war in the Gulf, as we see it, clearly demonstrates that we are seriously behind schedule in drafting a comprehensive convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. In these circumstances it is obvious that all of us should once again take a critical look at our fundamental attitude to the convention and take the necessary political decisions to ensure full and unreserved support for the future convention on the part of all participants in the negotiations. This is the guarantee of success.

Unfortunately, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, S.B. Batsanov, will be away from Geneva until Monday for previously planned consultations. He asked me to say on his behalf that in order to perform effectively the functions of Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, he intends to co-operate extensively with all interested delegations participating in the talks both as members of the Conference and as non-members. The goal of such co-operation, as he sees it, is to try to lay the foundations which on the one hand will contribute to the achievement of a generally acceptable compromise on outstanding issues connected with the draft convention, reflecting a balance between the interests of the different parties in the negotiations, and on the other hand will guarantee the effectiveness and universality of the future convention.

(Mr. Antyukhin, USSR)

We feel bound to point out that the circumstances which helped to bring the negotiations to the very significant stage they have now reached did not come about by accident. A considerable personal contribution was made here by the distinguished representatives of States who have served as previous chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. In this connection, I would like to refer in particular to the last Chairman, the Ambassador of Sweden, Ambassador C.-M. Hyltenius, whose pragmatism, openness, intuition and, when necessary, stubbornness, played a substantial role during the 1990 session of the Ad Hoc Committee in the achievement of important results on the basis of which we now have to make the last breakthrough to the signing of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

I would also like to inform you that the representative of the USSR to the Conference on Disarmament has received instructions from his Government to the effect that, if elected Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, he should actively promote negotiations, devoting special attention to finding solutions on key political issues leading to the completion of work on the multilateral convention.

In conclusion, S.B. Batsanov has asked me to inform the distinguished delegates that with the agreement of the secretariat of the Conference, the first meting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will be held next Tuesday, 19 February at 3 p.m. in room V.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. Does any other member wish to speak on the decision just adopted? I see none.

We shall now deal with agenda item 5. The secretariat has distributed document CD/WP.402, containing a draft mandate for a re-established Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. I now intend to put the proposed draft mandate before the Conference for action. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference decides to adopt the draft mandate.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I now turn to the appointment of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. I am informed that consensus exists on the appointment of Ambassador García Moritán of Argentina as Chairman of that Committee. May I therefore proceed to register that decision?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: On behalf of the Conference, I congratulate Ambassador García Moritán on his appointment as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee under agenda item 5. I extend to him our best wishes for success in discharging the important responsibilities for which he has now been appointed.

I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Hyltenius, as Co-ordinator for the Group of 21 on item 5.

Mr. HYLTENIUS (Sweden): I should like to make the following statement on behalf of the Group of 21 in connection with the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.

On 4 December 1990, the United Nations General Assembly, by an overwhelming majority and only one dissenting vote, adopted resolution 45/55 A on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The resolution reiterates that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. It requests the Conferenoe on Disarmament to consider this question as a matter of priority. It also requests the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its consideration of the question of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, building upon areas of convergence and taking into account relevant proposals and initiatives.

The Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space has, over the years, accorded extensive consideration to several issues that have been before it. It has already examined and identified the need to reinforce the legal régime applicable to outer space, as well as the need for strict compliance with existing agreements. It has also considered further measures and the need to hold appropriate international negotiations in accordance with the spirit of the outer space Treaty. In this context the Group of 21 wishes to recall the large number of proposals from all groups introduced in the Conference on Disarmament since the inception of the work of its Ad Hoc Committee in 1985, as demonstrated in documents CD/908/Rev.1 and CD/OS/WP.28/Rev.1. In particular, several of them are, in the view of the Group of 21, ready for in-depth and more structured treatment as they have gathered a substantial degree of support among the majority of the members of the Committee.

The Group of 21 has therefore proposed that this year the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space should have a negotiating mandate. The Committee should thus, in the view of the Group, focus on concrete proposals to prevent an arms race in outer space, and continue to build upon areas of convergence with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. To the regret of the Group of 21, however, it has not been possible to improve adequately the mandate of previous years, due to the reluctance of some delegations to accept such a change.

In order to facilitate the speedy resumption of work, the Group of 21 has decided to go along with the same mandate as before. This is a renewed demonstration of the flexibility and goodwill of the Group. It is our hope that other delegations will respond constructively to this attitude and agree to a more focused approach to relevant issues, so that we can move forward in areas where there are prospects for agreement. The Group holds that any delay of the work of the Committee should be avoided, given the urgent need to address this important agenda item. The Group of 21 is of the opinion that the Ad Hoc Committee should therefore start work immediately in order to achieve progress and attain positive results, and expects substantial movement on the mandate issue in the near future.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

Before concluding, I should like to take this opportunity to congratulate Ambassador García Moritán of Argentina on his appointment as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. His experience and diplomatic skills guarantee that the Committee will be in very competent hands, and I am convinced that it will make substantive progress under his guidance.

The PRESIDENT: I now give the floor to the representative of France as Co-ordinator of the Western Group on this item.

Mr. BESANCENOT (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, this is the first time that I have had the honour of taking the floor in this forum, and therefore I would like at the outset to congratulate you on my delegation's behalf on the manner in which you have acted as President of our Conference during these first important four weeks of the annual session.

On behalf of the Group of Western Countries I would like to express our satisfaction at the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, and the Conference's adoption of the same mandate for the Committee as in the past. A reading of the Ad Hoc Committee's report is sufficient to persuade one that the Committee must continue in-depth analysis of all questions relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, in order to reconcile positions on basic concepts, which is essential in order to envisage negotiations on measures in this area. Experience has shown that the present mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee was sufficiently broad and flexible to enable all interested delegations to make their contribution to this common quest, including the consideration of new proposals. We would like to thank the other groups and other members of the Conference for their efforts which led to the adoption of this decision. We hope that this sense of realism will enable the Committee to embark on its substantive work without further delay. Lastly, I would like to congratulate His Excellency Mr. García Moritán, the representative of Argentina, on his election as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. Both his diplomatic skills and his country's well-known interest in this agenda item make us confident in the prospects for this session.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of France for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Moritán.

Mr. GARCIA MORITAN (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): In this last stage of your presidency, I would like to express my delegation's appreciation to you for the important task that you have performed at the start of the 1991 session of the Conference on Disarmament. The decisions adopted this morning offer a clear demonstration of your diplomatic skills and the effort made to get our work off to a good start. In that context I wish to express appreciation for the confidence placed in my delegation through the appointment to lead the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, and also to thank those who congratulated me. I would like to take this opportunity to thank Ambassador Shannon of Canada for the work done in 1990 as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, and the important support received from the secretariat during his term of office.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. Does any other member wish to refer to the decision that we have just taken? I now give the floor to the representative of China, Ambassador Hou Zhitong.

Mr. HOU (China) (translated from Chinese): I wish to say a few words after having listened to many interesting statements today. I shall be very brief.

I am very happy to speak for the first time this year at the plenary of the Conference on Disarmament. First of all, please allow me on behalf of the Chinese delegation to extend our congratulations to you, as the distinguished representative of friendly Sri Lanka, on being the first President of the session, and on the excellent way you have accomplished the important task of starting the session. I would also like to take this opportunity to pay our tribute to Ambassador Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, and Ambassador Berasategui, Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference.

We listened with great interest to the statement by His Excellency Mr. Ali Akbar Velayati, Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Since last August the heads of a number of delegations have changed. I take this opportunity to warmly welcome among us the new ambassadors, Ambassador Semichi of Algeria, Ambassador O'Sullivan of Australia, Ambassador Ditchev of Bulgaria, Ambassador Tóth of Hungary, Ambassador Baljinnyam of Mongolia and Ambassador Calovski of Yugoslavia. I wish these new colleagues every success in their work and look forward to friendly co-operation with them. At the same time I would like to say to those ambassadors who have left - Ambassador Chaalal, Ambassador Dietze, Ambassador Kosin, Ambassador Reese, Ambassador Sujka and Ambassador Morel - how much we miss them and wish them every success.

Under your able guidance, Mr. President, steady new progress has been made in the work of the Conference. In addition to other ad hoc committees, the ad hoc committees on an NTB, chemical weapons and outer space have been re-established today. New decisions have been taken on important agenda items such as nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war. In this connection, I wish to extend our congratulations to you as well as to the Conference. Our felicitations also go to Ambassador Chadha of India, Mr. Batsanov, head of the Soviet delegation, and Ambassador Moritán of Argentina on their appointment as chairmen of the three committees. We are convinced that with their outstanding skills and rich experience, they will guide the committees to new achievements. Here I would like to offer them as well as the officers of the Conference the close co-operation of the Chinese delegation. At the same time I would like to express once again our thanks to Ambassador Donowaki, Ambassador Hyltenius and Ambassador Shannon, the chairmen of the three ad hoc committees in 1990, and their officers, for their outstanding work and contributions.

The principled stands of the Chinese delegation on the nuclear test ban, the cessation of the nuclear arms race, the prevention of nuclear war, chemical weapons and outer space, including our position on the mandate of

(Mr. Hou, China)

those ad hoc committees, are consistent and well known to everyone, and therefore I will not elaborate. I would like to emphasize here that it has been the common objective cherished and pursued by people all over the world to free the world from chemical weapons. The conclusion of the negotiations on a convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons is an important task entrusted to the Conference on Disarmament by the international community. The current developments in the international situation have further proved the importance and urgency of accomplishing this historic task at an early date. The Chinese delegation would like to reiterate that the key to the success of our negotiations on a chemical weapons convention lies in firm adherence to the fundamental objective, namely the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons. It is a matter of course that an unconditional ban on the use of chemical weapons and the thorough destruction of all chemical weapons should be included. This is the common ground for the whole negotiation process. We are convinced that so long as all parties to the negotiations adhere to this commitment by conducting earnest and pragmatic negotiations and fully demonstrate their political will, we will surely attain our goal.

It is the set objective of China to work actively for the early conclusion of such a convention. The Chinese delegation will, as always, continue to co-operate with other delegations in a constructive and earnest manner in our joint efforts to achieve the early conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of China for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair.

Since there are no other speakers on this subject, I propose now that we again take up agenda item 6. You will recall that at our 578th plenary meeting, the Conference decided to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons. Consultations have been proceeding on the appointment of a Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, and I am happy to inform you that there now seems to be a consensus on the nomination of Ambassador Juraj Králik of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic for that position. I now invite the Conference to take action in that connection by appointing Mr. Králik Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I extend to Ambassador Králik the congratulations of the Conference on his appointment as Chairman of the subsidiary body re-established under agenda item 6 and, as in the case of other colleagues appointed for similar responsibilities, I wish him success in the performance of his duties as presiding officer of the Ad Hoc Committee.

With the actions taken today on organizational matters, we have agreed on arrangements for most items on our agenda, with the exception of agenda item 8, entitled "Comprehensive programme of disarmament". As you know, there is no consensus at present on the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee. At our last plenary meeting I informed you that if there was no agreement on a particular agenda item, in accordance with the provision contained in

(The President)

paragraph 5 (d) of document CD/1036, I would try to identify a special co-ordinator who would be responsible for reaching consensus on an appropriate organizational arrangement for that agenda item. Unfortunately, my consultations have produced no results yet, and it will therefore be up to my successor to continue my efforts in that respect.

With the decisions taken today, we are now in a position to start substantive work in the subsidiary bodies of the Conference. I am informed by the secretariat that it is the intention of the incoming President to convene a meeting of chairmen of subsidiary bodies to review the weekly timetable and the timing requirements of each ad hoc committee, so that we might use the resources allocated to us in the most effective way. On that basis, a weekly timetable will be circulated for the information of members in the delegation's pigeon-holes.

I should like to inform you that I have been approached by the representative of Hungary in connection with the possibility of holding an additional plenary meeting on Wednesday, 20 February. He has also raised the issue with the group co-ordinators. The reason for this request is a visit to Geneva by His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary, who wishes to address the Conference on that date. I have consulted the co-ordinators and, on the basis of the views expressed by them, I have informed the representative of Hungary that the Conference would be happy to listen to the statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. After discussing the matter with him, it was clear that the additional plenary meeting could not be held on Tuesday, 19 February, because of the Minister's previous engagements. This being the case, we agreed that the additional plenary meeting would be held on Wednesday, 20 February, at 10 a.m. Of course, it is understood that this recommendation that I submit to the plenary does not set a precedent for holding meetings on days other than Thursdays or Tuesdays. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference accepts the proposed arrangement.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I have no other business for consideration by the Conference today. Allow me therefore to make a concluding statement in my capacity as its President.

We began our 1991 session under unprecedented conditions obtaining in the international scene. Ironically, some of these were grave portents while others promised a great positive potential. The essence of the message from the President of my country, which I had the honour to convey to you at our first plenary meeting, was that we have to maximize the positive aspects while minimizing and reversing the dangerous trends. This will only be possible through a genuine process of multilateral consensus-building. Despite the sombre reflections and uncertainties engendered by the ongoing conflict, the seriousness and the spirit of compromise that have been evident during the past four weeks to finalize the start-up work of our 1991 session are indeed a source of encouragement.

As regards the organizational questions, I am certain that all my distinguished colleagues share my satisfaction that five ad hoc committees have been re-established.

(The President)

(On the important question of a nuclear test ban, I hope that the Ad Hoc Committee will be able to start substantive work soon under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Chadha of India on the basis of the decision we have taken a little while ago. The very fact that it was possible to re-establish this Ad Hoc Committee despite strong views held by the delegations concerning the terms of reference of this Committee signifies the great importance attached to this question. I have no doubt that the same spirit of compromise and understanding will prevail in carrying out the substantive work of the Committee in a way that will contribute to the achievement of a nuclear test ban, which is one of the highest-priority items on our agenda. I would like to express my deep appreciation to Ambassador Donowaki of Japan, who conducted painstaking and skilful consultations last year and during the inter-sessional period. His efforts have contributed in no small measure to facilitating substantive work on this item.)

We have also been able to reach early agreement on an appropriate organizational framework to deal with agenda items 2 and 3. I hope that this framework will facilitate a productive exchange on substantive issues involved, as it did last year, enabling us to reflect our perceptions in that regard in a more focused way in our report to the General Assembly this year.

The decision we have just taken on agenda item 4 once again signifies the spirit of compromise displayed by all groups and delegations. I do hope that, as the President of Sri Lanka stated in his message to the Conference, the demonstrated willingness to get on with the work of conclusively negotiating a treaty on this subject will augur well for the early realization of the convention. The meticulous care and skill with which the Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Batsanov, has embarked upon his onerous duties make us confident that the Committee will make decisive progress this year.

Another priority item on our agenda, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, will be dealt with under the dynamic leadership of Ambassador Moritán of Argentina. I am pleased that it was possible to reach agreement on this important question, since the cumulative work done by the CD during past years has indicated interesting and productive avenues to explore on this subject.

The early agreement reached to re-establish ad hoc committees on radiological weapons and negative security assurances will have given sufficient time for all delegations to prepare for constructive work of substance on these important items. I am aware that the chairmen, Ambassador Králik of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and Mr. Robertson of Canada, are conducting consultations with a view to organizing the work of the committees.

It was also possible to reach an understanding with regard to the first part of agenda item 7, entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons". We will accordingly keep this matter under review and deal with it whenever necessary with a view to treating this subject in a way commensurate with the importance attached to it.

(The President)

After lengthy consultations and much skilful diplomacy displayed by Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan, several decisions were taken last year concerning the improved and effective functioning of the Conference. Due to the co-operation extended by all delegations and groups it was possible to reach an understanding with regard to the manner in which we should deal with this important subject in the Conference this year. Ambassador Kamal was accordingly appointed to conduct consultations bilaterally with members of the Conference to determine whether there would be common ground for addressing certain issues relating to this question. I am certain that Ambassador Kamal with his usual vigour and skill will continue his consultations with a view to building upon the area of agreement reached last year.

The Conference was also able, at an early stage, to take appropriate decisions facilitating the participation of non-members in the Conference. I take satisfaction - a sentiment which I am certain my distinguished colleagues share - at the fact that the trend of increasing participation by non-members continues. This is indicative of the growing awareness of and interest in substantive work being done at the Conference. It also augurs well for enhancing the multilateral character of our collective work.

Among the pending issues is the comprehensive programme on disarmament; agreement has yet to be reached on an appropriate organizational arrangement for dealing with this agenda item. Consultations will continue on this question.

In conclusion I would like to express my deep appreciation to the group co-ordinators and to all delegations who have always extended to me their fullest co-operation and understanding. The expeditious decisions on organizational matters were largely due to the co-operation extended to the President by all. A special word of gratitude should go to Ambassador Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, and Ambassador Berasetagui, the Deputy Secretary-General, who have always provided valuable advice with professionalism and skill. I also thank the other members of the secretariat who have helped me and my delegation in carrying out our responsibilities during the past four weeks. I would also like to convey my thanks to the interpreters for the efficient job they always do, and particularly for their patience and goodwill today during the extended session. Finally, I would like to convey my best wishes to the incoming President, Ambassador Carl-Magnus Hyltenius of Sweden. We are already familiar with his competence and diplomatic skills and are confident of a most successful stewardship of the Conference under his presidency.

That concludes my statement. I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Wednesday, 20 February, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.583
20 February 1991

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 20 February 1991, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Carl-Magnus Hyltenius (Sweden)

GE.91-60358/2936B

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 583rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset I wish to give a warm welcome, on behalf of the Conference, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary, His Excellency Dr. Géza Jeszenszky, who on the occasion of his visit to Geneva expressed the wish to address us. As is known, the Minister assumed his high office after devoting his professional activities to the academic field, where he played an outstanding role in his country. I am sure that members will follow his statement with particular interest, and I wish to thank him for joining us today.

As this is the first plenary meeting of the Swedish presidency of the Conference, I should now like to make an opening statement.

It is an honour for Sweden to assume the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. The Conference has a great responsibility and a vital function, not least today when recent developments have underlined the need to find global solutions to a number of pressing political issues. Some of these are on our agenda, and it is our responsibility to deal with them in an effective manner. The history of disarmament negotiations is full of disappointments, but it also shows that important agreements can be negotiated in this framework. In fact, the global multilateral disarmament machinery has produced some important treaties, and at least one major new convention is now within reach.

It is encouraging that many States participate in our work even if they are not members of the Conference on Disarmament. In today's world, global and multilaterally negotiated solutions are become even more necessary than before.

There are reasons to believe that this Conference will gradually move towards a greater degree of mutual understanding between delegations and groups of delegations. Such a trend is already noticeable in the context of the United Nations General Assembly. For example, the proportion of resolutions adopted without a vote in the First Committee has been rising the last few years. It has also been possible for the United Nations Disarmament Commission to conclude some of its long-standing issues with consensus reports. It is to be hoped that the vanishing effects of earlier East-West confrontation will not be replaced by a North-South axis of tension that might be equally paralysing for work in the field of disarmament. We can all contribute to avoiding that danger, but it requires an effort by all parties to take the legitimate interests of others into account. We are indeed faced with an opportunity that must not be missed.

It is with great satisfaction that I recall that despite certain difficulties, it has already been possible to re-establish no less than five ad hoc committees, which can now start working. I should like to pay tribute to my predecessor as President of the Conference,

(The President)

Ambassador Rasaputram of Sri Lanka, for his achievement and for his authoritative and skilled stewardship. I shall certainly spare no effort to discharge my responsibilities in the best possible manner, but whether substantive progress will be made or not is, of course, dependent on all participants in this important endeavour.

The greatest threat that faces mankind is the danger of nuclear war. It is therefore proper that the nuclear issues are at the top of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. It is a source of satisfaction that the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban was re-established last year. It has now been established again, and it is my hope that it will very soon get down to substantive work. Statements made in this Conference testify to the importance that many delegations attach to this issue.

As in previous years, it was not possible to reach agreement on the establishment of ad hoc committees on agenda items 2 and 3. However, arrangements have been made for a thorough discussion of these items, as demonstrated by the very comprehensive list of topics read out by the President at our last plenary meeting. I hope that all interested delegations will participate actively in the discussions, so as to prepare the ground for future solutions to the vital issues involved.

It is my view that the conclusion of the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention is within reach. The Ad Hoc Committee will resume its work today. The current conflict in the Middle East has once again illustrated the importance and urgency of these negotiations.

An increasing number of States will become active in the peaceful uses of outer space. Some of them may also contemplate military uses which may be considered threatening to other States. The CD has an opportunity of making a decisive contribution to the efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space before it becomes an established fact. There are several examples of similar agreements in the past, preventing undesirable developments, agreements which have proved to be extremely useful. The re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee provides this opportunity.

Negative security assurances have been the subject of consideration in the CD for many years. The Ad Hoc Committee just established can register a new development, since the United Nations General Assembly last autumn managed to agree on one single resolution on this issue. Radiological weapons will continue to be dealt with in an ad hoc committee. Hopefully the work of the Committee will make substantive progress this year in the two Contact Groups on tracks A and B. There is no agreement to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. I therefore plan to appoint a Special Co-ordinator on this issue. The consideration of the question of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference will continue. Last year's consultations led to some concrete results, and I hope that further progress will be made.

(The President)

The problem of the expansion of the membership of the Conference, and the more recent issue of whether the number of members should be allowed to decrease, require in my view active consideration. It has been pending for a very long time. It is the first time in the history of this Conference and its predecessors that the question of expansion has been considered for such a long time without any decision being taken. As you recall, it was agreed as early as 1979 that the membership would be reviewed at regular intervals, and in 1982 a decision in principle was taken on the question of expansion. However, no progress has been noted, which has been reflected in the repeated unchanged wording of the relevant passage in the report to the General Assembly. Non-members have been waiting for many years for a decision. It is high time that the Conference moved from words to deeds in this matter, and I therefore intend to pursue it actively during my presidency.

That concludes my statement. I now have pleasure in giving the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary, His Excellency Dr. Géza Jeszenszky.

Mr. JESZENSZKY (Hungary): It is a great pleasure for me to address the Conference on Disarmament as the Foreign Minister of the first Hungarian Government since 1947 responsible to a freely and democratically elected Parliament. First of all, let me congratulate you, Sir, on your accession to the important post of President, and wish you every success in your highly responsible work. Let me also express my gratitude to the representatives of the States members of the Conference, and in particular Ambassador Rasaputram of Sri Lanka, the previous President, for their understanding and co-operation in making this special plenary meeting possible.

The Conference on Disarmament, this prestigious body, is an important forum for conducting negotiations on issues that are primordial for international peace and security. During the decades of existence of the Conference and its predecessors this manifold task has been met with great expertise, intensive work and valuable results.

The present modalities of the work of the Conference were elaborated more than a decade ago and have remained practically unchanged. The topics on the agenda are questions of real significance. During the 1980s, however, new challenges have also emerged, many of them having a direct bearing on international peace and security.

This session of the Conference on Disarmament is taking place when the international community is making grave efforts to restore the sovereignty of Kuwait, which has fallen victim to an inadmissible act of aggression. We firmly believe that the numerous Security Council resolutions calling for the unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait reflect the principle of collective security enshrined in the United Nations Charter.

It is obvious that the Gulf conflict will have a major impact on the realities of global politics, and the unfolding new situation will differ in many ways from what it used to be before 2 August 1990. At the same time there are other factors that have already exerted their influence on the status of world affairs.

(Mr. Jeszenszky, Hungary)

In the wake of the revolutionary democratic changes in Europe, confrontation between East and West is falling into oblivion. This process was marked most recently by the adoption of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe and the signing of a treaty of historic importance, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

Hungary has always attached special importance to the ongoing arms control negotiations in Vienna. These negotiations faithfully reflected all the positive trends that have characterized our continent during the last two years. It was an encouraging phenomenon that apart from the biggest military Powers, which bear primary responsibility in maintaining security and stability in Europe, smaller States could also actively play a part in creating the final consensus.

I think it is needless to stress again that my country has a special interest in building a new co-operative security structure in Europe that would extinguish the division of the continent once and for all. We are of the firm belief that the tranquillity and stability of the "European house" is closely intertwined with the successful continuation of the CFE negotiations.

Last November, the Paris summit created the overall impression that the foundation of a new European security structure was established and a historic breakthrough had been achieved. In fact, the CFE Treaty is not just an ordinary agreement but the first multilateral treaty ever to stipulate significant reductions in conventional armed forces. We continue to believe that this treaty indeed holds the full potential for serving as a solid and accurately drafted basis for the realization of the principal objectives of conventional arms control in Europe. The key for the success of this endeavour lies in the full-scale implementation of its correlative provisions.

We consider it a basic test for the whole CSCE process that all States - without exception - should recognize their special responsibilities and spare no efforts in order to forestall any negative impacts on the realization of our shared original objectives. Let us hope that the very near future will prove that each and every State party to the CFE Treaty is ready to heed the appeals of others and, accordingly, is able to work in the same constructive spirit as that which we experienced at the very same forum previously.

There is another factor of change in world affairs, namely, the growing importance of multilateralism. The revitalization of the United Nations has been felt in recent years. The united stand of the international community in facing the events since last August has proved that the role of the world organization will be upgraded even more in the future. Thus, it is solely up to us to make full use of the existing vast possibilities.

In parallel with these positive trends, a regrettable phenomenon is gaining ground in multilateral affairs. There is a growing difference in approaches between North and South, a danger inherent in many of the issues of international security. While seeking solutions to pending problems care must be taken to avoid the emergence of new rifts and tensions, especially along the North-South axis, since this might undermine the very objective of those constructive efforts.

(Mr. Jeszenszky, Hungary)

Besides promising tendencies, signs of growing disharmony are showing between the performance of the Conference on Disarmament and the direction as well as the pace of events having a direct impact on international security. Even at this juncture, where the further course of developments remains unclear, it seems to be appropriate to launch an informal process of assessing the challenges and possible solutions in the context of multilateral disarmament.

The Conference was rightly designated more than a decade ago the multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament. This role itself, however, proved to a reason for heated, sometimes "theological" debates, when the expression "negotiating body" had to be filled with substance. We are convinced that it is of the utmost importance to preserve the primary function of the Conference of working out disarmament agreements through concrete and direct negotiations. Nevertheless, it must be realized that a strict and narrow interpretation of the negotiating function is illusory. It does not always reflect the political realities, and might only yield fruitless political wrangling.

With remarkable intensity the Conference on Disarmament is performing its task of elaborating a multilateral convention on the comprehensive and total prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of their stockpiles. The problem of chemical weapons is, of course, only one of several items on the agenda of the Conference. There are other items, many of them highly important, on which subsidiary bodies are now functioning but where no major breakthrough has been achieved over a prolonged period of time. On some other items, even getting down to substantial work has for years been impossible.

The "Decalogue" of the Conference was created to be a wide and flexible framework, covering practically all aspects of disarmament. The present agenda, built on the basis of this Decalogue, concentrates the efforts of the Conference on weapons of mass destruction. Given the enormous destructive power of such weaponry, no reasoning is needed to justify that special attention. Nevertheless, we cannot forget that the nuclear and chemical threats are not the only dangers facing mankind. The Decalogue provides us with a very useful umbrella, and it might be opportune to start thinking whether the present agenda could be developed through a gradual and realistic adjustment in order to face the realities of the world.

The Conference on Disarmament offers another rare opportunity through the fact that it is a forum where countries are represented both politically and geographically in a balanced manner. This unique balance provides a sound framework for dealing with global security and disarmament issues and can contribute to the reconciliation of differing approaches.

Speaking about the need to adapt to the requirements of a changing international environment, let me address some of the challenges we consider as being of overriding significance from the point of view of security and stability. For years nuclear issues dominated the disarmament agenda, often practically precluding the possibility of considering the issue of conventional weapons. Without denying the importance of nuclear disarmament, this approach, in my view, turned out to be misleading. It has often been argued that States with the largest arsenals have a special responsibility in

(Mr. Jeszenszky, Hungary)

pursuing the process of conventional disarmament. The first CFE agreement, when implemented, will have produced conventional force levels in Europe that will enhance stability by eliminating former imbalances and fundamentally reducing capabilities for launching a surprise attack or a large-scale offensive.

Attempts to bring about further reductions in conventional forces in Europe might be affected by the size of armed forces in the neighbouring regions. The Gulf crisis has shown dramatically that an excessive level of conventional armed forces cannot be considered as an internal problem of a given region. We are, of course, aware of the differences in security requirements that exist geographically. Yet it is also true that no region can be isolated from the overall security situation. We do not see why conventional disarmament could not be initiated in regions where massive arms accumulation no longer serves the sole purpose of legitimate self-defence but rather aggressive intent, as evidenced by the tragic invasion of Kuwait last summer.

Regional initiatives are the most promising in the field of conventional disarmament. Experience gained from the implementation of conventional disarmament and confidence-building measures, as well as measures of military openness in certain regions, might also be relevant in a wider context. Sharing information on conventional force levels and measures aimed at reducing them could well help promote the cause of conventional disarmament in different parts of the world. I believe that the Conference on Disarmament could provide a framework for such a wider exchange of relevant information.

In 1990, Hungary provided the participants of the Conference on Disarmament with detailed information on the structure and primary indicators of our military forces, and the significant reductions that have taken place in the Hungarian army, and we also presented a report on our military expenditure. We considered this step an example of our readiness to strengthen the transparency of military affairs and to take voluntary confidence-building measures. It is also evident that arms transfers can have serious implications for conventional disarmament in addition to the effects on stability. The lack of a mechanism to keep track of even legal transactions might provide ideal terrain for an aggressive arms build-up, contributing to the aggravation of the situation. Restraint on the side of suppliers and recipients alike can do a lot to alleviate the problem.

In fact, it was only recently that a seemingly routine arms deal carried out by a Hungarian foreign trading company had an unfortunate impact on bilateral relations with a neighbouring State. The unwelcome outcome of the transaction led to the realization that amidst circumstances of creating a free-market economy and liberalizing trade it is a special responsibility of the Government to step up control over the arms trade, however minor the share it might account for in our economic activities. We are convinced that greater openness and transparency in international conventional arms transfers would have a major role in confidence-building. Adequate national supervision of arms transactions also has a contribution to make. Hungary for its part is ready to co-operate on a bilateral, regional or multilateral level to seek ways and means to tackle the problem.

(Mr. Jeszenszky, Hungary)

Most of the security challenges the world has to face today have manifested themselves strikingly in the Gulf war. These include the menace resulting from nuclear and missile proliferation, the possible use of chemical and biological weapons and the introduction of the ecological weapon.

The issue of ballistic missile capabilities is gaining special relevance today and has implications that go beyond any given region. The deplorable endeavour to escalate the Gulf conflict clearly demonstrated that possession of such military hardware and technology coupled with irresponsible political behaviour could represent a major threat to international security and stability. Important measures have been taken to thwart missile proliferation. The Missile Technology Control Régime or relevant Soviet-American co-operation could be cited as examples. Yet the effectiveness of these steps is somewhat curtailed since they are far from comprehensive. It could be useful to study the possibility of introducing confidence-building measures in addition to the existing régime and taking further steps of openness in order to increase mutual trust and security. This is also a field where the global multilateral approach could contribute to the solution of problems.

The Gulf conflict has brought the problem of nuclear non-proliferation to the centre of attention again. The fourth NPT review conference in 1990 proved that the majority of the international community attached great significance to this issue. However, the fact that the existing régime lacks the adherence of certain States of crucial importance, and that the course of related events is accelerating, suggest that there is a need to establish a framework of contacts with these States. It might be advisable to take this into account when preparing for the next NPT review conference, which will be a milestone in the history of non-proliferation efforts.

I am convinced that the persistent threat of chemical weapons represents one of the major dangers with respect to human suffering. I suppose that many of us here were shocked by the pictures showing the frightening skills children acquired in using gas masks. Surely, none of us would like to create a future where such abilities are a prerequisite of human existence and where mankind has to learn to live under the perilous shadow of chemical weapons.

After more than 20 years of negotiations we need no additional arguments in favour of the early conclusion of the chemical weapons convention. We need action now, decisive and urgent action. This item of the agenda will have to be solved in the near future, despite the obvious fact that answers to major political and technical questions have yet to be found.

For any multilateral disarmament agreement to be viable the widest possible adherence is of crucial importance. In the case of the chemical weapons convention this means the involvement of all States that have declared the possession of chemical weapons and all States that have the technological capability of producing such weapons. In order to achieve the aim of universality the future convention must be attractive in the broadest sense and in no way discriminatory for potential States parties.

(Mr. Jeszenszky, Hungary)

The future multilateral legal instrument should be equitable in terms of rights and obligations of States parties. In the context of the convention, this entails an unconditional rejection of the use of chemical weapons connected to the obligation to destroy existing chemical weapon stockpiles totally.

I would like at this forum to reiterate once again our commitment to the total prohibition of chemical weapons. Hungary is among the States that have declared their intention to become original parties to the chemical weapons convention. My country declared in 1989 its intention to be in full conformity with the main provisions of the convention still being negotiated. In February 1990, as a measure of openness, we provided detailed data on the activities of our chemical industry as required by the draft provisions of the convention. I am pleased to announce that in document CD/1061 we are repeating this declaration and putting forward all the information required under the future convention. We are convinced that this step will contribute to the cause of negotiations, and we would welcome similar confidence-building measures on the part of other negotiating parties as well.

In my understanding current negotiating efforts are aimed at preparing possible solutions for a number of outstanding political issues related to the future chemical weapons convention. This set of solutions in turn could be formalized by the foreign ministers of States represented in the Conference on Disarmament, with the aim of giving a final push towards the successful conclusion of negotiations. I personally would be pleased to come back to the Conference for a ministerial meeting and share the common satisfaction of contributing to the efforts aimed at finalizing the draft convention.

In considering ways and means to preserve the vitality of the Conference on Disarmament, we could perhaps ponder what other issues are to be taken up after the successful termination of negotiations on chemical weapons. It might be deemed timely to initiate informal contacts amongst members of the Conference to probe different ideas. These informal contacts could and should, in due time, lead to wide agreement on relevant and politically feasible measures, however partial they might initially be.

The ideas presented in my statement are not an endeavour to pre-empt too precipitately such a process, but an effort to promote its timely launching. These ideas are not in the least intended to undermine the very important substantive work currently being conducted in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament. Rather, they are meant to highlight the need to preserve the authority of this body by enabling it to face new challenges and helping it to enter into a new phase of its existence. Nature has provided numerous examples proving that inability to adapt to the changing environment is not an advantage in the race for survival, called evolution.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I have no other speaker on my list for this plenary meeting. Does any other member wish to take the floor? It seems not.

(The President)

I now turn to another matter. The secretariat has circulated today, at my request, a timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies between today and the end of next week. This timetable is the result of the consultations I held yesterday with the chairmen of the ad hoc committees. As usual, it is merely indicative and subject to change, if the need arises. I have agreed with the chairmen of the subsidiary bodies that we should maintain close contact to ensure that the programme of meetings is fulfilled expeditiously. On this understanding, I propose that we now adopt the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: Before I adjourn this plenary meeting, I wish to recall that, as announced by my predecessor at the last plenary meeting and as indicated in the timetable, the Conference will hold, tomorrow, Thursday, immediately after the plenary meeting, an informal meeting devoted to the substance of agenda item 2, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

I note that, tomorrow, we shall have a visit from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Uruguay, who is listed as first speaker. I hope therefore that we can start our plenary meeting punctually.

I have no other business for today. I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held tomorrow, Thursday, 21 February, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.50 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.584
21 February 1991

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 21 February 1991, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Carl-Magnus Hyltenius (Sweden)

GE.91-60386/2976B

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 584th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

Firstly, I wish to warmly welcome, on behalf of the Conference, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Uruguay, His Excellency Dr. Héctor Gros-Espiell, who will be our first speaker today. The Minister is well known to the Conference, as he has held the position of Secretary-General of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. He has also been active in activities relating to the United Nations, in particular in the field of human rights, and has been Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. He has also held diplomatic positions, having already been Permanent Representative at the United Nations Office at Geneva. And last but not least, he is an outstanding jurist who has an important background as a professor of public international law. I am convinced that his statement will represent a useful contribution to our work.

I have on my list of speakers for today His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Uruguay and the representatives of Brazil and New Zealand. I take pleasure now in giving the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Uruguay, His Excellency Dr. Héctor Gros-Espiell.

Mr. GROS-ESPIELL (Uruguay) (translated from Spanish): Many thanks, Mr. President, for your very kind words and many thanks to the Conference on Disarmament which is receiving me today and is granting me the signal honour of addressing this meeting on behalf of the Government of my motherland. My feelings of appreciation and happiness at being amongst you today are enhanced by the fact that I am speaking in this chamber named after Francisco de Vitoria, surrounded by the magnificent frescoes painted by the great Spanish artist José María Sert, a chamber whose bronze doors are engraved with unforgettable quotations and ideas from the great Spanish jurists and theologians who in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, along with Grotius, embarked on the very difficult task of building international law based on the idea of an international community.

This is the first time that a Minister for Foreign Affairs of Uruguay has spoken at the Conference on Disarmament. I think that the participation of a small country that is not a member of the Conference and is only an observer in the Group of 21 - small, I say, peaceful and law-abiding, whose own security is based on the very notion of collective security, with armed forces in which there is obviously no problem of an arms build-up, and which are limited to the minimum necessary in order to carry out their specific functions - is of special significance. Through it this Conference can hear the voice of a country that is devoted only to law and principles, and this I think is of very special significance, particularly at the present time in the face of current problems. It is clear that there is a very close and intimate relationship between disarmament, arms limitation and control and the concepts of peace and security. But I think that this relationship, which is beyond question and well known to everyone, should be highlighted at the present time, in the situation we are living through, because we have been given the best possible demonstration of the fact that without a process of arms limitation and control genuine peace is impossible.

(Mr. Gros-Espiell, Uruguay)

In the statement I delivered to the General Assembly of the United Nations on 4 October 1990 entitled "The vulnerability of peace without disarmament", I said one or two words that with your permission I would like to repeat again:

> "The events in the Persian Gulf remind us of the vulnerability of peace when it is not based on a system of international arms limitation and control, with the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. Dividing walls may be torn down; ideological confrontations may be mitigated; borders may be opened to communication and trade, the wings of democracy may fly over and destroy anachronistic authoritarian schemes, but no stable security or lasting peace will be attained as long as gigantic arsenals exist all over the world, ready to be used by any arbitrary and aggressive government.
>
> "An armed world, one in which the great and the small furnish themselves with powerful and inhuman instruments of destruction and death, does not provide the proper framework for peace. The events of the Gulf were possible because the States involved thought they were ensuring the effectiveness of their reckless acts through the support of excessive military power, resulting from an uncontrolled arms race.
>
> "The international community must avoid the occurrence of similar dangerous situations in the future. That will be possible only if we accelerate the disarmament process. Uruguay understands that the immediate task is to concentrate on further advancing the regulation and limitation of armaments, whether conventional, nuclear, chemical, bacteriological, radiological or space weapons."

In my brief statement today, it is clear that I cannot, nor should I, seek to deal with all the items, even to say a few words on each of those that are on the agenda of the Conference. I need only refer to one or two of them because of their current significance and the importance my country attaches to them, either because of their general implications or because of their regional aspects.

First of all, therefore, allow me to say a few words on the question of chemical weapons, as it stands today in the view of my Government. We know that from the legal standpoint the present situation on the chemical weapons issue is determined by the existence and applicability of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, a protocol that was supplemented many years later, because this Protocol had emerged from the work of the League of Nations, by the 1972 Convention, drafted within the United Nations and devoted to the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and their destruction. But it is clear that these two international instruments, which are manifestly important and necessarily applicable, do not by any means exhaust the international agenda on the subject of chemical weapons. For that reason the Paris Conference of 1989 on the prohibition of chemical weapons analysed the problem in the light of the present situation, and concluded that it was necessary to expedite this process in order to complete the legal framework of the total ban on all the aspects of the chemical weapons issue.

(Mr. Gros-Espiell, Uruguay)

In this context, the work of the Conference on Disarmament is obviously of great importance, and today is of a topicality and urgency that cannot be ignored by anyone. The Paris Conference, in the year 1989, on the one hand, recognized the importance and continuing validity of the 1925 Protocol, and at it the States parties to that Protocol solemnly reaffirmed the prohibition as established in it and called upon States that have not yet acceded to it to do so, but underscored, and this is what is important, what I wish to emphasize today, the necessity of concluding, at an early date a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons, and on their destruction. This is the major challenge we face as far as chemical weapons are concerned at the present time, one that in the light of the current situation it is necessary to expedite with renewed efforts and with sure hopes of arriving as soon as possible at an acceptable solution for the entire international community which will be implemented immediately without fail. In this regard, I wish to refer to the statement by the Group of 21 which was made very recently on 7 February 1991 in the form of an exposé by Peru on behalf of the Group. On this basis, on this awareness of the urgency, the importance, the topicality and this Conference's inescapable commitment to the international community with regard to the chemical weapons issue, my Government hopes that in a short time it will be possible to present this convention that is being so eagerly awaited.

The other item I wished to refer to is the item relating to the arms race in space. The mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and the statement made by Sweden on behalf of the Group of 21 on 14 February last are major steps to permit progress on this topic. Thus both with regard to chemical weapons and on the arms race in outer space, two ad hoc committees are in operation and we hope that in both cases this Conference will be in a position to set an example of swiftness, calm, thorough and practical analysis, in solving these problems.

With regard to the item on nuclear weapons, an item which obviously could not be ignored in the statement I am making in this Conference, I would like to recall the words I spoke on behalf of the Uruguayan Government on 21 August 1990 at the conference to review the non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). After analysing what the NPT means with regard to the process that would counter the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and recalling that my country is a party to the non-proliferation Treaty and has always strictly fulfilled its obligations thereunder, I added the following, which I believe must always be borne in mind:

> "Is the NPT perhaps the only possible form, the only way to combat and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons? Uruguay considers that the NPT is the most important route or avenue, but that it would be a doubtful claim to assert that it is the sole and exclusive road towards the objective of non-proliferation. Non-proliferation is not limited to the NPT. It also has its basis in the treaties under which nuclear-weapon-free zones have been established in inhabited regions of the globe. I am referring to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Rarotonga. But although non-proliferation is the common aim of these treaties and those which may be concluded in the future to establish new nuclear-weapon-free zones and the NPT, it cannot be denied that those

(Mr. Gros-Espiell, Uruguay)

agreements do not have - that is to say, the Treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga - the premonitory element that some States find in the NPT, as they draw no distinction between States parties in relation to the prohibition on supplying, producing, importing or using nuclear weapons."

Two zones free of nuclear weapons exist in the world today, fully in force and of relative applicability: the zone created by the Treaty of Tlatelolco in Latin America and the zone created by the Treaty of Rarotonga in the South Pacific. Their importance is obvious. With regard to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, my country has always been concerned, with a concern that still applies fully, to help to achieve the full and total application of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, so that it covers the entire geographical area described in article 4 of the Treaty. Consequently, in the statement I delivered at the NPT review conference and to which I have already referred, I said in that regard:

"Uruguay, which is a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, is making every effort to promote texts relating to this Treaty that will enable Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Cuba to become parties to it, and secure their adoption in due course. As is well known, Argentina has signed but not ratified, Brazil and Chile have ratified, but without the waiver provided for under article 28, paragraph 2, and Cuba has not yet signed. Uruguay, which nurtures the wish that the whole of Latin America will be free of nuclear weapons, which will not be achieved until these four States, which are not parties to the NPT, enter into the Tlatelolco system, is preparing on the basis of consultations a number of texts that will enable these four sister countries to join the regional non-proliferation régime."

Subsequently to that month of August 1990, major events took place which it is necessary to mention. The Declaration of Foz do Iguaçú drafted on 28 November 1990 by Presidents Menem and Collor of Argentina and Brazil respectively marked an extremely important step forward towards the possibility that these two sister countries will become full parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Immediately after the Declaration of Foz do Iguaçú, Uruguay contacted the Governments of Argentina and Brazil to express its satisfaction and its whole-hearted readiness to co-operate with them in order to attain the objectives set forth in that Declaration and in this connection I would also like to recall that in the weeks following that Declaration of November 1990 Chile officially expressed its wish to participate in a process that would make it possible to arrive at the moment to present the waiver in question. As for Cuba, Uruguay has been carrying out sustained diplomatic efforts, through direct contacts between the Foreign Ministries of Cuba and Uruguay, in an endeavour to co-operate to the utmost with a view to the desirable ultimate objective that Cuba too will become a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. We hope that this open process, an important part of which will unfold in the coming weeks in Vienna with regard to the contacts that are being made by Argentina and Brazil in this regard, will be successful and that we will have very good news soon.

Another subject I would like to mention is the relationship which cannot be denied, and I think that present events point to this ever more clearly, the close and necessary relationship between the problems of arms limitation

(Mr. Gros-Espiell, Uruguay)

and control and international humanitarian law. In our view it is necessary to prevent disarmament negotiations from being a closed preserve, a dialogue between political specialists on disarmament without any contacts with public opinion or with the progress and development of the remainder of international law. In this connection I think that the Convention of 10 April 1981 on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects is an example. Although this Convention was drawn up in a special United Nations conference on prohibitions or restrictions of use of weapons and not within this Conference, it is an example of the relationship, the parallelism, between the problems of arms limitation and international humanitarian law. The Convention to which I have just referred is not strictly speaking a disarmament convention, but it is one lato sensu, as is indicated by its inclusion in the United Nations book on the status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements.

I also wish to say a very few words on the relationship between the processes of arms limitation and regulation in the light of disarmament and the protection of the environment, the basic issue of the present day. The relationship between these two concepts is clear, and if we do not develop an appropriate and rational process of limitation and regulation of arms build-ups, if we do not properly tackle the question of nuclear tests and nuclear explosions, then we will be contributing to the dreadful problem of the deterioration of the environment. The Convention of 10 April 1972 on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques is an example, a first step towards using treaties to handle this relationship between two issues of vital importance for the future of mankind. But this is a convention that deals with only one aspect of the problem, having been drawn up in 1972. Since then 18 years have passed, and today the problem of environmental protection has acquired a seriousness and urgency and a pressing need for solutions which goes beyond what could have been imagined at that time. This means, in my view and in the view of the Government of Uruguay, that we must tackle this problem head-on, and that the issue must be dealt with in a frank and thorough manner at the Conference on Environment and Development which is to be held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.

Finally, I wish to point to the importance my country attaches to the participation of the Latin American countries as observers in the Conference on Disarmament - Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica and Uruguay - and reiterate once again their full support for the views that were set forth in the document of 15 February 1991. These countries wish to co-operate in the work of the Group of 21, and I think that the importance of this participation is obvious. There is a projection and necessary understanding on the part of these observer countries that wish to attend the proceedings of the Conference on Disarmament as a means of contributing, although they are not members of the Conference, to progress and forward movement on this issue which is essential for the survival of mankind itself at this very critical time for the entire world.

My thanks once again, and I would like to reiterate not only the great personal honour for me to be able to address you, but also Uruguay's whole-hearted calling to contribute to the success of the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. RICUPERO (Brazil) (translated from Spanish): The privilege of speaking immediately after Minister Gros-Espiell enables me to emphasize the significance and inspiration of the views we have just heard, enriched not only by the moral authority of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of a country with such an impeccable tradition where peace, security and international co-operation are concerned, but also by a lifetime of study, labour and personal dedication to the cause of disarmament.

(continued in English)

Mr. President, it is an honour and a pleasure for me to be among the first to address to you our congratulations on the presidency that we are sure will greatly benefit from the same quality of competence, balance and search for compromise that have so outstandingly distinguished your recent chairmanship of the Committee on Chemical Weapons. Our words of appreciation and praise go also to Ambassador Rasaputram, whose tireless energy and thoughtful diplomatic efforts have created the necessary conditions for the programme of work for the present session of the Conference. Finally, let me add my voice to those who expressed feelings of sadness for the departure of so many remarkable colleagues in recent months, as well as my welcome greetings and best wishes to the new representatives who have joined our common endeavour.

In continuation and confirmation of a practice recently established, it gives me special satisfaction to take the floor on behalf not only of the Government of Brazil, but also of the Government of Argentina, to provide this session with information on recent developments in our nuclear co-operation. One of the approaches being developed by both countries to support the bilateral process of integration is the strengthening of confidence-building mechanisms by means of stable and broadened co-operation. This effort has led to a number of concrete achievements.

Less than three months ago Presidents Fernando Collor and Carlos Menem signed a Declaration on Common Nuclear Policy in the border town of Foz do Iguaçú. Ambassador García Moritán and I have been instructed to request that it be distributed as a document of this Conference.

Dr. Hans Blix, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and Dr. Antonio Stempel Paris, Secretary-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, attended the Foz do Iguaçú ceremony as special guests. On that occasion, a time frame for the implementation of important objectives of our nuclear policies was established by the two Presidents, aiming at the adoption of a common nuclear material accounting and control system, to be applied to all nuclear activities in both countries; the negotiation with the International Atomic Energy Agency of a joint safeguards agreement, on the basis of the common accounting and control system; and the adoption of initiatives to facilitate at a later stage the entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the political objectives of which are fully shared by our two countries.

The decisions for short-term implementation then taken have already been substantively carried out, including the exchange of descriptive lists of nuclear facilities; the exchange of declarations on the initial inventories of nuclear materials; and the first reciprocal inspections of the centralized register systems.

(Mr. Ricupero, Brazil)

The next step, to take place shortly, is the presentation of the International Atomic Energy Agency of the register and reporting system which is part of the common accounting and control system. As the name suggests, it consists of common procedures for accounting, registering, reporting and inspection, which will guarantee each party systematic access to all the nuclear facilities of the other party and keep track of all nuclear materials in both countries. Having established the procedures for accounting, registering and reporting, experts from both countries are now developing the inspection mechanisms.

Under previous declarations Brazil and Argentina had already set up the structure within which technical and industrial co-operation would take place between the two countries. A protocol was concluded allowing for increased industrial complementarity in the construction of the Atucha II and Angra II nuclear power plants. The Permanent Committee on Common Nuclear Policy has been meeting for about two years now and will continue to meet alternately in Argentina and Brazil to assess technical co-operation and set guidelines and co-ordinate positions to be followed in international forums dedicated to nuclear energy and nuclear disarmament.

Openness and transparency are key elements of the nuclear co-operation between Brazil and Argentina. Confidence-building in the nuclear field can be more easily achieved by means of close technical and political co-operation. Thus, the common mechanisms and procedures which are being followed by our Governments are a natural outcome of broad, stable and intimate co-operation encompassing all fields. They constitute a logical corollary of that co-operation.

In the case of Argentina and Brazil the "trust and verify" principle has acquired a more wholesome and gratifying expression. Our experience in the field of nuclear co-operation has taught us that "trust and verify" should not be systematically inverted to "verify and trust". Undoubtedly, inspections are crucial and indispensable, but in the absence of the desirable political conditions they may not be enough to reduce or eliminate mistrust and suspicion.

The joint safeguards agreement to be concluded by Brazil and Argentina with the International Atomic Energy Agency will be based on the common accounting and control system and will provide all the information needed to secure the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in both countries, while respecting Argentina's and Brazil's right to develop nuclear technology without undue restrictions, and protecting the confidential information of a technological and industrial nature acquired in the process. The agreement will also have to be compatible with the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

The third step approved in the Declaration of Foz do Iguaçú relates to the updating and improvement of the text of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, particularly those articles detailing verification and compliance procedures. The adjustments concern the need to harmonize the provisions aimed at defining the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with the need to preserve confidential information of a technological and industrial nature.

(Mr. Ricupero, Brazil)

The Governments of Argentina and Brazil believe that the Treaty of Tlatelolco thus updated needs to be accorded due recognition, and that it should come into force as soon as possible for all Latin American countries and for all the States referred to in Protocols I and II. We continue to consider the Treaty of Tlatelolco the appropriate instrument to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Latin America, a goal which it has in fact achieved since its conclusion in 1967.

We hope our nuclear co-operation will encourage others to intensify their negotiations aimed at substantially reducing their existing nuclear arsenals, thus opening the way for further negotiations with the constructive participation of all nuclear-weapon States.

In concluding my remarks, I wish to state that the Governments of Brazil and Argentina share the perception that they have already achieved an important objective: the consolidation of a constructive approach towards nuclear security through nuclear co-operation. An approach which tends to be at the same time more amenable and more effective. Nevertheless, we expect more of our initiative. We hope this positive approach can serve as an example for the encouragement and reinforcement of regional and global security.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Brazil for his statement and for the very kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of New Zealand, Ambassador Hannah.

Mr. HANNAH (New Zealand): Let me begin by congratulating you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the Conference on Disarmament presidency for the next four weeks. Sweden and New Zealand have many shared views on disarmament and international security issues. You can be assured of our support during your presidency. We, for our part, are confident that the momentum of the Conference will be strengthened by your personal contribution in the position.

I should also like to pay my respects to my neighbour on the non-members' bench today, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Uruguay, His Excellency Dr. Héctor Gros-Espiell. I followed his thought-provoking statement with great interest. So, too, the statement of the distinguished Ambassador of Brazil, speaking on behalf of his own country and Argentina.

My statement this morning is devoted entirely to the subject of chemical weapons. Specifically, I wish to place before the CD the report of New Zealand's national trial inspection, contained in document CD/1057. Before doing so, however, I would like to make a few general comments on the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention - at this moment the prime focus of the work of this Conference.

New Zealand does not have, and has never had chemical weapons. We do not allow chemical weapons to be stationed on our territory. We are party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and in 1989 we withdrew our reservation to that Protocol which permitted the use of chemical weapons under certain circumstances. We took that step because the New Zealand Government does not now see any circumstances where the use of chemical weapons would be tolerable.

(Mr. Hannah, New Zealand)

The possibility that chemical weapons might be used in the Gulf war is of immediate concern. That threat confirms our belief in the need for a convention going far beyond the Geneva Protocol, one which effectively prohibits the development, production, stockpiling as well as the use of chemical weapons. That threat should strengthen the resolve of all of us to conclude such a convention as soon as possible.

It is against such a background that New Zealand's support for a chemical weapons convention should be seen. New Zealand is not a key participant in the negotiations. We have only a fledgling chemical industry and are unable to muster the technical expertise shared by so many here in this room. But we are following the negotiations closely. Our aim is that, once the chemical weapons convention is concluded, New Zeland will have the necessary legislation in place to become an original party. Others have already expressed a similar aim, and we hope many more will do likewise as the negotiations enter their concluding phase.

New Zealand is under no illusions that there still remain crucial political obstacles to be overcome before a chemical weapons convention becomes a reality. We accept that some of those may be beyond the scope of this body. That is why we support the idea of a ministerial conference, later this year, where the necessary political decisions might be taken. It goes without saying that such a conference should be open to all - CD members and non-members alike - who share our common interest in a chemical weapons convention. It is only through universal adherence that the chemical weapons convention will achieve its objective of ensuring that such weapons will never again be used anywhere on this Earth.

My Government's support for the conclusion of a comprehensive, effective, and verifiable chemical weapons convention is shared by the New Zealand chemical industry. As a measure of this support, Government and industry worked together to undertake a national trial inspection in November 1990.

As I have noted, New Zealand has only a small chemical industry, and limited technical resources at its disposal. We are not alone in that. Through discussion at regional meetings we are aware of the burden other small countries believe they will face in implementing the chemical weapons convention. One objective of our trial inspection was therefore to determine how the lessons learned from earlier inspections were applicable to those with more modest chemical industries. Bearing in mind our limited technical resources, a second objective was to examine the auditing aspect of an inspection, both as an indepedent measure of verification, and in its relationship to scientific monitoring.

The inspection we undertook was conducted at a multi-purpose complex of an agricultural chemical company that produces mainly herbicides. It is the largest of only a few chemical manufacturers in New Zealand. It does not produce any chemicals currently listed under schedule 2 of the "rolling text". For the purposes of the inspection, therefore, para-chloro-ortho-cresol (PCOC) was treated as a schedule 2 chemical. The declared activity at the plant during the inspection was the production of the herbicide sodium 4-chloro-2-methyl phenoxybutyrate (MCPB).

(Mr. Hannah, New Zealand)

The report of the trial inspection is contained in CD/1057. I will restrict my comments today to the two specific objectives mentioned earlier. The inspection demonstrated that commercial practices in today's chemical industry give rise to a myriad of overlapping records that can be audited as a means of verifying legitimate chemical production. The trial inspection clearly showed the effectiveness as a verification tool of a detailed financial and production records audit.

An audit of financial records was undertaken in addition to a production records audit to verify declared activities over an extended period of time (which a site inspection may not be certain to identify). The financial records audit also provided a thorough cross-check of production records in the event of a fraudulent dual accounting system (which we thought would most likely occur in the production domain). The independence of both recording systems provides extensive opportunity for the detection of undeclared activity, and should not be underplayed.

Although relatively straightforward, the records and production audit proved to be the most time-consuming aspect of the trial inspection. In undertaking the audit, a five-point strategy was adopted: (i) preliminary evaluation; (ii) production analysis and evaluation; (iii) financial substantive testing evaluation; (iv) internal control (compliance testing) evaluation; and (v) analytical review evaluation. This strategy, together with a list of documentation required for a production and financial records audit, is detailed in the annex to the report.

It was found that to undertake a records audit an inspector needed experience in both commercial auditing and management/cost accounting from a manufacturing background. A minimum of six to nine working days (depending on the complexities of the operation and number of independent processes) was necessary to complete an audit.

Looking more generally at the resource implications, the trial inspection reinforced for us the lesson that even for a modest chemical industrial facility subject to routine inspection procedures, a high degree of technical instrumentation and a wide variety of skills are needed to properly verify legitimate chemical industry activity. Physical inspection, financial and production records audit, and sample analysis are all essential ingredients of an effective inspection régime.

In undertaking such an exercise New Zealand used the full extent of its technical and scientific capability. It is our view that the resources required to attain such a capability are beyond the scope of many countries and that, accordingly, such countries are likely to face difficulties in meeting chemical weapons convention obligations. Granted the burden of routine and challenge inspections will fall not upon individual Governments, but upon the technical secretariat. But even so, the requirement to establish national authorities with the kind of capabilities I have just listed will not be easy for many.

In its conclusion, the New Zealand report identifies two possible ways to help overcome such difficulties. Firstly, countries need to review the technical/legal/scientific resources their regions possess, and the potential for regional co-operation in implementing the convention. Secondly,

(Mr. Hannah, New Zealand)

development at an early stage of a flexible but standardized methodology of key audit and inspection approaches would be desirable. This would ensure compatibility of inspection treatments, streamlined and effective techniques, and prior determination and preparation of the human resources and equipment required.

Since our inspection report was prepared, we have had the opportunity to study your own delegation's paper, CD/1053, which proposes ways of streamlining schedule 2 inspections. When you introduced that paper at last week's meeting, you expressed some doubts about the cost-effectiveness of schedule 2 verification in the draft convention. We share those concerns and, on the basis of our own experience, are particularly aware of the potential for a verification régime to overburden the national authorities of smaller would-be States parties. We look forward to the proposals in CD/1053 being closely examined by the Ad Hoc Committee.

Unless individual States are confident of their own ability to implement relevant aspects of the chemical weapons convention, there cannot be the necessary international confidence in the convention as a whole. The New Zealand experience is that, for many countries, there will be practical constraints quite different in nature from those facing the major players in the negotiations. We all need to keep these constraints in mind as we begin what all hope will be the year in which a chemical weapons convention is concluded.

I thank the members of the Conference and yourself, Mr. President, for hearing out a rather technical intervention, and I hope it is of assistance to the deliberations on the chemical weapons convention.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of New Zealand for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other representative wish to take the floor at this stage? I see none.

May I now turn to another subject? You will recall that, at our plenary meeting yesterday, I informed you of my intention to identify a Special Co-ordinator who would be charged with seeking consensus on an appropriate organizational arrangement for agenda item 8, entitled "Comprehensive programme of disarmament". I am pleased to report to you that my consultations have now been concluded and that I am appointing Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico as Special Co-ordinator for this agenda item. I am grateful to Ambassador Marín Bosch for having accepted this responsibility, and I am sure that he will discharge it with his usual diplomatic competence.

As indicated in our timetable of meetings, immediately after this plenary meeting the Conference will hold an informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 2, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

I have no further business today and I shall now proceed to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 28 February at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.05 a.m.